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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Peter A. Alces• 
Luther M Dorr, Jr. •• 
"The phases of fraud are manifold" 1 and developing fraud rules 
which are both reasonably certain and sufficiently flexible presents a sub-
stantial challenge to the drafters of commercial law. 
As to relief against frauds, no invariable rules can be established. 
Fraud is infinite; and were a Court of Equity once to lay down rules, 
how far they would go, and no farther, in extending their relief 
against it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the juris-
diction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes, 
which the fertility of man's invention would contrive. 2 
Lord Hardwicke's conclusion notwithstanding, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has endeavored to 
fix rules, some more "invariable" than others, intending to proscribe 
truly fraudulent transactions while not unduly impairing the free and 
dynamic flow of commerce. 
In February of 1985 the American Bar Association (ABA) approved 
the new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFT A), promulgated in Au-
gust of 1984 by the NCCUSL.3 The new Act is the Commissioners' lat-
est attempt to formulate the law governing the rights of defrauded 
• Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. A.B. 1977, Lafayette College; 
J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. 
•• Judicial Clerk, United States Senior District Judge Seybourn Lynne. A.B. 1981, University 
of South Alabama; J.D. 1985, University of Alabama. The authors gratefully acknowledge the thor-
ough research and editorial assistance provided by Robert G. Boliek. Jr .• J.D. Candidate, 1986, Uni-
versity of Alabama. 
I. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 371, 167 N.E. 501, 503 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J., writing 
for the majority). 
2. Letter from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaims (June 30, 1759), quoted in 1 J. STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA§ 186, at 
212 n.5 (1846). 
3. Morris W. Macey chaired the UFf A drafting committee; Frank R. Kennedy served as 
Reporter for the project. Members of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, the National 
Commercial Finance Association, and the ABA attended Committee meetings. In addition, the 
ABA sent delegates from its sections on Corporate, Banking, and Business Law, and on Real Prop-
erty, Probate, and Trust Law. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, Prefatory Note, 7A 
U.L.A. 67-68 (West Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as U.F.T.A.). 
The drafters renamed the new Act to emphasize that the UFf A applies to realty as well as 
527 
528 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1985 
creditors by regulating transactions which impair the capacity of a 
debtor to discharge its obligations and, therefore, operate to the prejudice 
of those with claims against the debtor. The Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act (UFCA),4 the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,5 and, to 
some extent, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)6 currently regulate 
such transactions. 
This article places the UFf A in historical context and compares the 
new Act to the prior law, describing the provisions of the new Act in 
some detail. Then, the article offers a critical evaluation of the UFT A 
and considers applying the new uniform law to problems of significant 
current interest to commercial transactors. The article concludes that 
the UFT A leaves unanswered problems of increasing concern to the 
commercial community and urges reconsideration of certain crucial as-
sumptions of the new uniform Act. An appendix to this article repro-
duces the full text of the UFfA. For the reader unfamiliar with the 
contexts in which fraudulent commercial transfers may arise, this article 
provides a hypothetical fact pattern in the margin. 7 
personal property transactions, and to involuntary as well as voluntary transfers of a debtor's prop-
erty. See id. at 68. 
The ABA approved the Act at its meeting in Detroit, Michigan, on February 18, 1985. The 
NCCUSL formally approved the Act at its meeting in Keystone, Colorado, on July 27-August 3, 
1984. See U.F.T.A. The title page of the pamphlet edition of the Act published by the NCCUSL 
provides notice of and dates of approval. 
4. Both the NCCUSL and the ABA approved the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 
1918. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, Historical Note, 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978), super-
seded by U.F.T.A. [hereinafter cited as U.F.C.A.]. The Commissioners promulgated the UFTA to 
replace this increasingly obsolescent earlier model act. See generally U.F.T.A., Prefatory Note (dis-
cussing the UFCA's basic characteristics and the various influences leading to the promulgation of 
its successor, the UFT A). See also infra notes 8-78 and accompanying text for a full discussion of 
the historical influences on the UFT A. 
5. 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-151326 (1982). 
6. Article 6 of the UCC provides the law governing bulk transfers. See U.C.C. §§ 6-101 to 
-111 ( 1978). 
Common law adopting the Statute of Elizabeth also regulates fraudulent conveyances in non-
UFCA states; see, e.g., Rice v. Wood, 61 Ark. 442, 33 S.W. 636 (1896); Butler v. Moore, 73 Me. 151 
(1882); Reynolds v. Vilas, 8 Wis. 227 (1858). Statutes essentially embodying the Statute of Elizabeth 
rule provide similar regulations; see, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 8-9-6 (1984); VERNON's TEX. REv. C1v. 
STAT. ANN. art. 3996 (Vernon 1966) (repealed 1967); see TEX. Bus. & CoMM. CODE ANN.§ 24.02 
(Vernon 1968)). 
7. DebtorCo, a small construction business, borrows money to purchase construction equip-
ment. Sister Corp. , a real estate company that has a substantial ownership interest in DebtorCo, 
loans the money to DebtorCo and takes a security interest in the equipment. 
A year later, DebtorCo experiences financial difficulty. Although the company accountant can 
produce a balance sheet that demonstrates solvency, DebtorCo barely pays its bills and has not paid 
one large account debt for construction materials in over three months. 
Pursuant to an agreement between DebtorCo and Sister Corp., DebtorCo stops making 
monthly payments on its loan from Sister Corp. Sister Corp. then declares that DebtorCo is in 
default under the terms of the loan agreement, and exercises its right to repossess and sell the collat-
eral to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. Sister Corp. buys the equipment at the foreclosure sale 
for approximately 60% of its market value, then leases the equipment back to DebtorCo under a 
long-term lease. 
One month before DebtorCo is scheduled to distribute regular dividends to shareholders, a 
motorist is injured through the recklessness of a DebtorCo truck driver. DebtorCo proceeds with its 
scheduled distribution to shareholders. DebtorCo makes the payment according to state corporation 
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. The Statute of Elizabeth8 
529 
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act resulted from the evolution 
of the law of conveyances in fraud of creditors. While fraudulent disposi-
tions of property were regulated under Roman law,9 Anglo-American 
rules in this area descend from England's Statute of 13 Elizabeth, en-
acted in 1571.10 The original penalty under the Statute was forfeiture of 
the fraudulently conveyed property value-half to the government and 
half to the injured creditor. 11 The English courts, however, construed the 
Statute as providing a private remedy and allowed judgment creditors to 
simply ignore a fraudulent transfer and to proceed directly against the 
property. 12 
The Statute of Elizabeth required that a creditor prove actual, sub-
jective intent to hinder, delay, or defraud to avoid a conveyance. 13 Be-
law and does not deplete its assets to the point where its liabilities would exceed assets. The distribu-
tion, however, substantially reduces the company's cash assets at a time when the company is pre-
paring to begin work on a major construction project. 
With proof of an actual intent by DebtorCo and Sister Corp. to defraud creditors, any creditor 
may challenge the default and forfeiture scheme and the resulting foreclosure sale as fraudulent. In 
addition, creditors who held claims against DebtorCo at the time of the foreclosure sale and the 
shareholder distribution may challenge those transactions under constructive fraud claims. Briefly, 
these constructive fraud claims may allege that DebtorCo received inadequate consideration to sup-
port the transaction and that DebtorCo (I) was rendered insolvent thereafter; (2) intended to incur 
debts beyond its ability to pay; or (3) was left with insufficient assets to carry out its business. Such 
claims also may allege that Sister Corp. was an "insider" of DebtorCo, transacted to satisfy an 
antecedent debt owed Sister Corp. by DebtorCo, and knew of DebtorCo's financial difficulties. 
8. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). 
9. SeeM. Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109 (1931). Ro-
man law elaborately developed thefraus creditorum cause of action. "Fraus" in Latin means "preju-
dice" or "disadvantage," rather than "misrepresentation," a significant distinction in light of the 
Anglo-American law's confusion over actual and constructive fraud. /d. at 110-11 (citing JusrtN-
IAN's DIGEST). 
The development of Roman fraudulent conveyance law was marked by a severe attitude toward 
insolvents. The ancient Romans dealt with debtors in the same manner as with thieves. A single 
judgment creditor could sell a debtor into slavery or put the debtor to death. If a debtor was so 
unfortunate as to have incurred debts with several creditors, then these creditors legally could dis-
member the debtor's body and divide it among themselves. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 15 
(Belknap Press ed. 1963). 
10. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 58 (rev. ed. 1940). See 
also 27 Eliz., ch. 4 (1585) (supplementing original Statute by protecting purchasers of realty from 
fraudulent conveyances). 
11. "[P]arties to such feigned, covinous or fraudulent . . . alienation . . . shall incur the pen-
alty and forfeiture of one year's value of [the fraudulently conveyed real property]; . . . and the 
whole value of the said goods and chattels; . . . and also as much money as are or shall be contained 
in any such covinous and feigned bond; . . . the one moiety where of to be to the Queen's Majesty 
.. . and the other moiety to the party or parties grieved." 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § III. Originally promul-
gated as a criminal sanction, the Statute imposed a penalty of six months. See id. (parties lawfully 
convicted "shall suffer imprisonment for one-half year without bail or mainprise"). 
12. See Mannocke's Case, 3 Dyer 294b, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1571) (disregarding penal 
provisions of Statute and allowing creditor to recover value of property fraudulently conveyed). 
13. The Statute's purpose was as follows: 
avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinous and fraudulent feoffments, gifts, grants, aliena-
tions, conveyances, bonds, suits, judgments and executions . . . which . . . are devised and 
contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion or guile, to the end purpose and intent, to delay, 
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cause subjective intent to defraud was difficult to prove, courts focused 
on objective factors to establish the wrongful intent. 14 Decisions under 
the Statute soon turned on "circumstances, so frequently attending sales, 
conveyances and transfers, intended to hinder, delay and defraud credi-
tors, that they [were] known and denominated badges of fraud." 15 The 
court in Twyne's Case16 cataloged several factors having particular pro-
bative force: (1) the debtor made a general transfer of all property; (2) 
the debtor retained possession and use of the property; (3) the transfer 
was clandestine; (4) the transfer was made "pending the writ"; (5) the 
parties created a trust to govern use of the property; or (6) the deed ex-
plicitly vouched for its own validity and the parties' honesty and good 
faith. 17 
American jurisdictions enacted legislation similar to the Statute of 
Elizabeth or adopted the Statute as part of the common law}8 The 
American courts similarly adopted the English decisions that expanded 
the Statute through the use of objective indicia of fraud; later American 
decisions also increased the list of "badges."19 Although a strict con-
struction of the Statute required proof of fraudulent intent, many courts 
permitted creditors to avoid a transfer on the basis of objective factors 
alone. 20 The resulting decisions became increasingly difficult to rational-
ize. Ultimately, some of the objective indicia of fraud rose to the status 
of conclusive presumptions21 and once the courts found these objective 
criteria, evidence of the parties' intent was neither required nor rele-
vant. 22 For example, when an insolvent debtor transferred property for 
hinder or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, 
damages, penalties, forfeitures, heriots, mortuaries, and reliefs. 
13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1571). 
14. See, e.g., F. WAIT, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES AND CREDITORS' BILLS§ 224 (3d ed. 
1897) (discussing the need to rely on objective indicia to prove fraud in most circumstances). See 
also Cadogan v. Kennett, 2 Cowp. 432, 434, 98 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1172 (K.B. 1776) ( .. [t]hese statutes 
cannot receive too liberal a construction, or be too much extended in suppression of fraud"). 
15. Thames & Co. v. Rembert's Adm'r, 63 Ala. 561, 567 (1879) (emphasis in original) (invali-
dating conveyance by insolvent debtor to relative, when debtor was pressed by a large suit and 
retained possession of some property supposedly conveyed). 
16. 3 Coke SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601) (setting aside preferential conveyance 
of debtor's farm and personal property). 
17. See id. Later decisions expanded the badges of fraud to include virtually any circumstance 
suggesting fraud. See, e.g., M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES 515-28 (K. 
Knowlton 2d ed. 1911) (defining and cataloging various minor badges of fraud). The number of 
badges may be .. as infinite in number and form as are the resources and versatility of human arti-
fice." Shealy & Finn v. Edwards, 75 Ala. 411, 417 (1883). 
18. See M. BIGELOW, supra note 17, at 23-29 (discussing states' adoption or enactment of 
Statute); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 10, §58. 
19. See F. WAIT, supra note 14, § 22. 
20. See. e.g., Wilt v. Franklin, 1 Binn. 501, 516 (Pa. 1809) ( .. Although the Statute 13 
Eliz. . . . is bottomed on the supposition of an immoral intention, yet it has been judged necessary 
to determine, that certain circumstances, which, in their nature, tend to deceive and injure creditors, 
shall be considered as sufficient evidence of fraud.") and cases cited in D. EPSTEIN, TEACHING 
MATERIALS ON DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 244-46 (1973) and S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' 
REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 354-55 (2d ed. 1975). 
21 . See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 20, at 355. 
22. See, e.g., Bean-Chamberlain Mfg. Co. v. Standard Spoke Co., 131 F. 215 (6th Cir. 1904) 
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inadequate consideration, the courts presumed as a matter of law that 
such a conveyance was in fact motivated by an intent to defraud. 23 
If the debtor is insolvent when he makes the gift, or the effect of it is 
to leave him insolvent, his intent appears as a conclusion of law 
drawn from these facts. His intent, in these circumstances, is to hin-
der, delay and defraud his creditors, because of the working princi-
ple that one is taken to have contemplated the necessary 
consequences of his acts. 24 
As use of the badges of fraud increased, fraudulent transfer cases 
focused on the prejudicial effect of a particular conveyance on the 
debtor's creditors, rather than on the actual intent of the 
debtor/transferor and the transferee.25 In Rolfe v. Clarke,26 a terminally 
ill debtor transferred real property to a friend in exchange for a promise 
to care for the debtor and her husband. The trial judge found no intent 
to defraud on the part of the debtor or her transferee and refused to avoid 
the transfer. The decision was reversed, however, on appeal. The appel-
late court noted that several of the traditional badges of fraud were pres-
ent and that the complaining creditor had been adversely affected by the 
transfer.27 The facts "showed an intention of the grantor which was 
fraudulent in law, although there was no actual intent to defraud her 
(invalidating conveyance by debtor of majority of corporation's assets to another corporation owned 
by debtor without inquiry into debtor's intent); Briggs v. Sanford, 219 Mass. 572, 107 N.E. 436 
(1914) (stating that common law under Statute of Elizabeth creates a presumption of fraud from 
conveyance by an insolvent for inadequate consideration). 
23. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U.S. 479 (1875) (recognizing Georgia rule whereby objective 
factors may raise rebuttable presumption offraud); Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73, 19 S. W. 111 (1892) 
(conveyance of real property to debtor's 5-year-old son for no consideration presumed fraudulent as 
to creditors); Hanscome-James-Winship v. Ainger, 71 Cal. App. 735, 236 P. 325 (1925) (transfer 
from insolvent debtor to wife for love and attention created presumption of fraud); Briscoe v. 
Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326 (1846) (invalidating transfer by debtor where consideration amounted to one-
half the value of the property transferred). 
24. G. GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES§ 270, at 362-63 (1931). Ami-
nority rule went even further, conclusively presuming any gifts given by a debtor to be fraudulent as 
a matter of law. See Haston v. Castner, 31 N.J. Eq. 697 (N.J. Ch. 1879) (allowing creditors to 
proceed against property conveyed to debtor's son for no consideration); Reade v. Livingston, 3 
Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (setting aside antenuptial conveyance of debtor's property in trust 
for the benefit of the debtor's wife and children). See also S. RIESENFELD, supra note 20, at 355. 
25. See, e.g., Sims v. Gaines, 64 Ala. 392 (1879) (transfer of land later claimed to be only a 
mortgage held fraudulent as to existing creditors); Schaible v. Ardner, 98 Mich. 70, 56 N.W. 1105 
(1893) (conveyance by debtor to son which left debtor with no assets to satisfy a pending tort claim 
presumptively was fraudulent as to creditors); Potter v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 62, 64 (1860) (setting 
aside conveyance when debtor was "in greatly embarrassed circumstances" with respect to credi-
tors). 
The question of fraudulent intent "is now generally considered to tum upon the consideration 
whether the debtor was at the time in a situation to make the [conveyance) injustice to his creditors. 
i.e., without delaying them in the enforcement of their rights." M. BIGELOW, supra note 17, at 78. 
See also F. WAIT, supra note 14, § 9, at 19 ("Whenever the effect of a particular transaction is to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, the law infers or supplies the intent, though there may be no 
direct evidence of a corrupt or dishonorable motive, but, on the contrary, an actual honest, but 
mistaken motive existed."). 
26. 224 Mass. 407, 113 N.E. 182 (1916). 
27. See id. at 411, 113 N.E. at 183 (noting the close relationship between debtor and transferee, 
intangible nature of consideration, and hardship caused to creditors). 
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creditors."28 The ultimate test, then, became whether there had been an 
"unjust diminution of the estate of the debtor that otherwise would be 
available to the creditor."29 
Such judicial analyses undermined the operation of the Statute of 
Elizabeth. 30 Expansive constructions of the Statute created specious de-
cisions and substantial confusion.31 In addition, the procedural require-
ments for challenging a conveyance varied considerably among the 
jurisdictions. 32 Fundamental differences among the states as to the tim-
ing, scope, and effect of a judgment or lien against a debtor exacerbated 
the confusion. 33 Those issues, in turn, brought into question the proper 
length and starting point for applicable limitation periods. 34 Thus, the 
need for curative uniform legislation was manifest. 
B. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 35 
The drafters of the UFCA attempted to respond to the ambiguities 
in fraudulent conveyance law by providing uniformity and predictabil-
28. ld. at 411, 113 N.E. at 183-84. 
29. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 10, § 195, at 348. Decisions turned on "whether as a result of the 
debtor's operations on the title to his property, the creditor loses by reason of finding less to seize and 
apply to his claim." Jd. 
30. M. BIGELOW, supra note 17, at 515-27. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 243-44. 
31. See,e.g., F. WAIT, supra note 14, at 440-41 (criticizing courts' tendencies to injure honest 
debtors and purchasers, caused by poorly defined rules regarding the weight properly accorded to 
different badges of fraud). 
32. The Statute of Elizabeth's provisions led to a general requirement of a judgment and an 
unsatisfied return as a condition precedent to a fraudulent conveyance action. See, e.g., Bond v. 
Warren County State Bank, 201 Iowa 1175, 207 N.W. 233 (1926); Jackson v. Holbrook, 36 Minn. 
494, 32 N.W. 852 (1887); Hart v. A.L. Clarke & Co., 194 N.Y. 403, 87 N.E. 808 (1909). Because the 
possibilities of precluding a jury trial on the creditor's underlying claim and of tying up the property 
of an alleged debtor existed, courts were reluctant to allow simultaneous actions in equity and at law. 
See, e.g., Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451, 459 (1893); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109 (1891); Adler 
Goldman Comm'n Co. v. Williams, 211 F. 530, 533 (W.O. Ark. 1914). As debtor-creditor law 
became more sympathetic to the interests of creditors, courts developed various exceptions to the 
judgment requirement and allowed a creditor to proceed directly against a conveyance without first 
obtaining judgment against the debtor. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal. 487, 77 P. 
1043 (1904) Gudgment would be impossible or useless); Crary v. Kurtz, 132 Iowa 105, 105 N.W. 590 
(1906) (debtor had died); American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929) (delay in 
obtaining judgment would unduly prejudice creditors' rights). Some jurisdictions adopted substan-
tive rules allowing a creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance before obtaining a legal remedy. 
See, e.g., ALA. CoDE§ 6-6-182 (1975); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 11-5-75 (1972); W.VA. CODE§ 40-1-14 
(1982). See also Note, Creditors' Rights-Attempt to Reach Debtors' Equitable Assets-Requirement 
of Prior Judgment and Execution at Law, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1141 (1934). 
33. For example, some jurisdictions held that a judgment lien could attach to fraudulently 
conveyed realty. See, e.g., McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal. 2d 468, 60 P.2d 1026 (1936); Jackson v. Holbrook, 
36 Minn. 494, 32 N.W. 852 (1887); Hillyer v. LeRoy, 179 N.Y. 369, 72 N.E. 237 (1904). Other 
states did not allow a judgment lien creditor to attach fraudulently conveyed realty. See, e.g., Union 
Nat'l Bank v. Lane, 177 Ill. 171, 52 N.E. 361 (1898); Joyce v. Perry, Ill Iowa 567, 82 N.W. 941 
(1900); Preston-Parton Milling Co. v. Dexter Horton & Co., 22 Wash. 236, 60 P. 412 (1900). See 1 
G. GLENN, supra note 10, § 121. 
34. See S. RIESENFELD, supra note 20, at 357 (limitations period could run from date of sale, 
judgment, execution of writ, or return on execution). 
35. See supra note 4. 
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ity. 36 They focused on the uncertainties attending increasingly sophisti-
cated, and often interstate, commercial transactions.37 Specifically, the 
drafters responded to the three primary areas under the existing legisla-
tion and common law that confused courts and commentators: courts 
unevenly applied the insolvency concept;38 courts inconsistently specified 
the proper parties and procedural steps necessary to challenge a convey-
ance; and courts extended fraudulent conveyance law to transfers carried 
out without actual fraudulent intent. 39 
Professor William Draper Lewis drafted the UFCA, 40 at the request 
of the NCCUSL's Committee on Commercial Law.41 Drafts were 
presented to the Conference for criticism and revision before the finished 
product was approved in 1918.42 The ABA approved the Act in 1919.43 
The legal community generally received the UFCA well.44 Commenta-
tors praised the Act and recommended its adoption to the states. 45 
Within six years of its promulgation, fourteen jurisdictions had enacted 
the UFCA. 46 The Bankruptcy Code also incorporated the Act as a sup-
plementary remedy for bankruptcy trustees seeking to recover the 
debtor's fraudulently transferred property.47 To date, however, only 
twenty-six jurisdictions have adopted the Act.48 Only four states have 
36. See generally U.F.C.A. Commissioners' Prefatory Notes (1918) ("There are few legal sub-
jects where there is a greater lack of exact definition and clear understanding of boundaries."). 
37. See U.F.C.A. Commissioners' Prefatory Comments (1918). 
38. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text. 
39. See U.F.T.A. Prefatory Note. See also McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REv. 404-05 (1933) (assessing value of UFCA fourteen years after 
enactment). 
40. William Draper Lewis was a Professor at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law at 
the time the UFCA was drafted. Samuel Williston was a member of the committee that requested 
Lewis's assistance. One commentator asserts that Williston principally drafted the UFCA. D. EP-
STEIN, supra note 20, at 247. 
41. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS 254 (1916). 
42. See Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws, 5 A.B.A. J. 481 (1919). 
43. See id. · 
44. See, e.g., Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act, 27 CALIF. L. REV. l, 12 (1938) (UFCA offers "clarity and breadth of view" to state 
law); Current Legislation, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 339 (1920) (UFCA "should commend itself to 
the legislatures of the States which have yet to consider it"); Rose & Hunsinger, Transfers in Fraud 
of Creditors. Ohio Law and the Uniform Act, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 571, 611 (1948) (citing "important 
improvements" offered by the Act); Comment, The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances in North Caro-
lina: An Analysis and Comparison with the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 50 N.C.L. REV. 
873, 901-02 (1972) (UFCA would offer clear, simple provisions as replacement for confusing state 
statutes); Note, Remedies of a Creditor for Setting Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance with Recommen-
dations for Changes, 6 S.C.L.Q. 80, 85 (1953) (UFCA is "highly desirable" because it provides "a 
positive course" which the creditor may follow). 
45. See sources cited id. 
46. See U.F.C.A. Historical Note Oisting UFCA jurisdictions). The early UFCA jurisdictions 
"included the commercially most important states of the Union." Radin, supra note 44, at 12. 
47. See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~~ 548.01 -.11 (L. King 15th ed. 1985) (com-
paring bankruptcy provisions to UFCA). 
48. See U.F.C.A. (Supp. 1985). The following states have adopted the Act: Arizona (1919), 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-1001 to -1013 (1967 and West 1984 Supp.); California (1939), CAL. 
CJV. CODE§§ 3439 to 3439.12 (West 1970); Delaware {1919), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301 to 
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enacted the UFCA since 1960,49 and only one state has adopted the Act 
in the past fifteen years. 50 
At the time of its promulgation the UFCA offered a new conceptual 
approach and terminology.51 Although it has provided a restatement of 
the Statute of Elizabeth's actual fraudulent intent rule, 52 the Act has fo-
cused primarily on the forms of constructive fraud that the parties could 
prove with objective indicia. 53 Transactions unsupported by adequate 
consideration54 and certain partnership transactions55 are fraudulent 
1312 (1975); Idaho (1969), IDAHO CODE§§ 55-910 to -922 (1979); Maryland (1920), MD. COM. 
LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-201 to -214 (1983 and 1984 Supp.); Massachusetts (1924), MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 109A, §§ 1 to 13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); Michigan (1919), MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN.§§ 566.11 to .23 (West 1967); Minnesota (1921), MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 513.20 to .32 (West 
1947}; Montana (1945), MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2-301 to -325 (1983); Nebraska (1980), NEB. 
REv. STAT.§§ 36-601 to -613 (1984); Nevada (1931), NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 112.010 to .130 (1984); 
New Hampshire (1919}, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 545:1 to :12 (1974); New Jersey (1919}, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 25:2-7 to -19 (West 1940 and 1985 Supp.); New Mexico (1959), N .M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 56-10.1 to -13 (1978); New York (1925), N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§§ 270.81 (McKinney 1945 
and 1984 Supp.); North Dakota (1943), N.D. CENT. CoDE§§ 13-02-01 to -11 (1981); Ohio (1961), 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1336.01 to .12 (Page 1979); Oklahoma (1965), OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 24, §§ 101-11 (West Supp. 1984); Pennsylvania (1921), 39 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 351-63 
(Purdon 1954); South Dakota (1919), S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 54-8-5 to -19 (1980); Tennes-
see (1919), TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 66-3-301 to -314 (1982); Utah (1925}, UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 25-1-
1 to -16 (1984); Virgin Islands (1957), V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 28, §§ 201-12 (1976); Washington (1945), 
WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 19.40.010 to .130 (1978); Wisconsin (1919), WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 242.Ql to .13 (West 1957); Wyoming (1929), WYO. STAT. §§ 34-14-101 to -113 (1977). 
49. Idaho, Nebraska, Ohio, and Oklahoma are the four states. See id. 
50. See supra note 48. 
51. Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REv. 495,497 (1983) (UFCA 
otTers new terminology and approach to familiar judicial rules). The Act did not attempt to "so 
much change the law as clearly define what heretofore (had] been indefinite." U.F.C.A. Commis-
sioners' Prefatory Notes. 
52. "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished 
from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraud-
ulent as to both present and future creditors." U.F.C.A. § 7. 
53. See McLaughlin, supra note 39, at 407; Radin, supra note 44, at 7-8; Cu"ent Legislation, 
supra note 44, at 339. 
54. § 4: Conveyances by Insolvent. Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred 
by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without 
regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair 
consideration. 
§ 5: Conveyances by Persons in Business. Every conveyance made without fair considera-
tion when the person making it is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for 
which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capi-
tal, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the con-
tinuance of such business or transaction without regard to his actual intent. 
§ 6: Conveyances by a Person About to Incur Debts. Every conveyance made and every 
obligation incurred without fair consideration when the person making the conveyance or enter-
ing into the obligation intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as 
they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
U.F.C.A. §§ 4-6. 
55. Conveyance of Partnership Property. Every conveyance of partnership property and 
every partnership obligation incurred when the partnership is or will be thereby rendered insol-
vent, is fraudulent as to partnership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is in-
curred, 
(a) To a partner, whether with or without a promise by him to pay partnership debts, or 
(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to the partnership as distinguished 
from consideration to the individual partners. 
/d.§ 8. 
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under the UFCA irrespective of the parties' actual intentions. The draft-
ers retained the complete protection which the Statute of Elizabeth gave 
to good faith purchasers for value56 and defined certain crucial concepts 
and key terms such as "insolvency,"57 "fair consideration,"58 "debt,"59 
and "creditor. " 60 
In practice, however, the UFCA has not always achieved the draft-
ers' goal to "clearly define what heretofore has been indefinite."61 Many 
courts in UFCA states still struggle to properly apply the badges of 
fraud. 62 Courts continue to resolve claims based on actual fraudulent in-
tent by using the traditional badges rather than proof of subjective in-
tent. 63 Indeed, some UFCA decisions draw no significant distinction 
between actual and constructive fraud.64 Courts often resolve creditors' 
56. See id. § 9 (giving defrauded creditors a right of recovery against any party "except a 
purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase"). 
57. Insolvency. 
(I) A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the 
amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become 
absolute and matured. 
(2) In determining whether a partnership is insolvent there shall be added to the partner-
ship property the present fair salable value of the separate assets of each general partner in 
excess of the amount probably sufficient to meet the claims of his separate creditors, and also 
the amount of any unpaid subscription to the partnership of each limited partner, provided the 
present fair salable value of the assets of such limited partner is probably sufficient to pay his 
debts, including such unpaid subscription. 
/d.§ 2. 
58. Fair Consideration. Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation,. 
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in 
good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or 
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance 
or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the 
property, or obligation obtained. 
/d. § 3. 
59. " 'Debt' includes any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, absolute, fixed or contingent." /d. § 1. 
60. " 'Creditor' is a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or 
unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." /d. 
61. /d., Commissioners' Prefatory Note. See also McLaughlin, supra note 39, at 452 (conclud-
ing that states' use of the UFCA was inadequate, with frequent failure to apply the Act in the 
appellate courts). 
62. Commentaries that encouraged the use of badges of fraud, excluded by the UFCA in inten-
tional fraud cases, even after adoption of the UFCA illustrated the confusion over the proper role of 
these badges. See, e.g., Note, Creditors' Rights-Remedies Available to Tort Creditor Without Judg-
ment in Michigan and Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 48 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712-
13 (1950); Note, Fraudulent Conveyances-Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act-Presumptions of 
Intent-Limitations of Actions-Necessity for Prior Judgment-Rights of Insurance Beneficiaries, 23 
MINN. L. REV. 616, 618-20 (1938). The decisions of courts applying the UFCA also demonstrate a 
reluctance to forego using objective indicia to prove fraudulent subjective intent by preserving the 
badges of fraud. See Bentley v. Caille, 289 Mich. 74, 286 N.W. 163 (1939); Thompson v. Schiek, 171 
Minn. 284, 213 N.W. 911 (1927); Conway v. Raphe), 101 N.J. Eq. 495, 138 A. 691 (1927), a.lf'd, 102 
N.J. Eq. 531, 141 A. 804 (1928). 
63. See Westminster Savings Bank v. Sauble, 183 Md. 628, 39 A.2d 862 (1944); Paxton v. 
Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932); In re Reed's Estate, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1977). 
64. See. e.g., In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 23 Banke. 823 (Banke. N.D. Ohio 1982) 
(presuming actual fraudulent intent from debtor's insolvency); Bryan v. Wilson, 171 Md. 421, 189 
A. 220 (1937) (inferring intentional fraud from glaring disparity between value of debtor's property 
and consideration received); Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585 
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claims alleging alternative types of fraud with a summary conclusion that 
the evidence demonstrates the fraud alleged. 65 When conveyances are set 
aside the decisions often do not indicate clearly whether the conveyance 
was actually or constructively fraudulent. 66 Because only present credi-
tors may challenge constructively fraudulent transfers by an insolvent 
debtor, this distinction is significant.67 
Despite the efforts of the drafters, considerable uncertainty also has 
persisted concerning who is a creditor, the party with standing to chal-
lenge a conveyance, and what procedural steps must be taken before 
bringing a claim under the UFCA. 68 Because it abolishes the judgment 
requirement and tends to blur the line between actions in equity and ac-
tions at law, the UFCA also has raised state constitutional issues in New 
Jersey.69 
Recently counsel for unsecured creditors have convinced courts to 
construe the UFCA as providing a basis for objection when a secured 
party forecloses on a debtor's encumbered property and then sells the 
property at the foreclosure sale for less than the market value. The lead-
ing case is Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 70 in which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated a fore-
closure sale as a fraudulent conveyance because the property was sold for 
only 57.7% of its market value.71 Later cases have described the "Dur-
(1971) (distinguishing intentional and constructive fraud as requiring different levels of proof, rather 
than as distinct theories of recovery). 
65. See, e.g., Virta v. Mackey, 343 Mass. 286, 178 N.E.2d 571 (1961) (stating only that evi-
dence supported finding of intentional fraud without discussing constructive fraud); Hartnett v. 
Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S.W.2d 227 (1932) (court did not differentiate between gift given by 
insolvent and transfer made with intent to incur debts beyond ability to pay). 
66. Tomason v. Wagner, 228 Minn. 124, 36 N.W.2d 587 (1949) (finding actual fraudulent 
intent in conveyance for insufficient consideration); Jahner v. Jacob, 252 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1977) · 
(stating that evidence supported finding of actual or constructive fraud without distinguishing be-
tween the two types of fraud). 
67. Only a creditor whose claim existed before the suspect transaction may challenge transfers 
by an insolvent debtor for inadequate consideration under the UFCA. See U.F.C.A. § 4. The Act 
allows all creditors, regardless of when their claims arose, to challenge all other types of fraud. See 
id. §§ 5-7. 
68. A 1920 review of the UFCA described its apparent abolition of the judgment requirement 
as a "revolutionary" development that would "require some hard straining" to avoid "turbulent 
possibilities." Current Legislation, supra note 44, at 341. Some states that previously had required a 
final judgment or lien as a prerequisite to creditor status continued to do so despite the UFCA's 
liberal definition of a creditor. See, e.g., Oakford Realty Co. v. Boarman, 156 Md. 65, 143 A. 644 
(1928) (court will set aside conveyance only when creditor proves through judgment and unissued 
execution that there is no adequate remedy at law); Comstock v. Horton, 235 Mich. 282, 209 N.W. 
179 (1926) (requiring judgment to fix amount of debt before allowing creditor's bill). 
69. See Gross v. Pennsylvania Mortgage & Loan Co., 104 N.J. Eq. 439, 146 A. 328 (1929) 
(UFCA held unconstitutional because it allowed equity court to determine damages on contract 
claim); Note, Rights of Creditors Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 35 DICK. L. REv. 
171, 173-74 (1930) (discussing New Jersey courts' treatment of UFCA "creditor" definition). 
70. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). The Durrett decision construed section 67(d) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Section 67(d)(2), however, is virtually identical to and is derived from section 4 of the 
UFCA. 
71. 621 F .2d at 203. For a thorough consideration of the Durrett rule, compare Alden, Gross 
& Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Dur-
rett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW. 1605 (1983) (defending Durrett as protective of creditors' interests) with 
No.3] UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 537 
rett rule" as providing that unsecured creditors may avoid a foreclosure 
sale for less than seventy percent of the property value as a fraudulent 
transfer of the debtor's property.72 But the Ninth Circuit, in In re Ma-
drid, 73 has refused to follow the Durrett rule. The Madrid court pre-
sumed that the price obtained in a regularly conducted, noncollusive 
foreclosure sale is adequate. 74 These conflicting interpretations of the 
UFCA have sparked debate regarding the balance between the interests 
of unsecured creditors and the need for certainty in secured credit 
transactions. 75 
Finally, several questions have restricted the usefulness of the 
UFCA. For example, the effect of the Act on prior statutory and case 
law is unclear. 76 Similarly debatable is the proper interpretation of "fair 
consideration" and "good faith."77 Also, developments in other areas of 
debtor-creditor law have confused courts applying UFCA provisions: 
the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 have created conflicts between the federal law and the UFCA, as 
have changes in the UCC concerning perfection of secured transactions. 
The committee which is revising the Model Corporation Act (MCA) re-
cently has requested a review of the UFCA to determine whether that 
Act is consistent with the MCA's treatment of dividend distributions. 78 
The UFf A represents the NCCUSL's response to these issues. 
Ill. THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
The new uniform Act follows substantially the structure and organi-
zation of the UFCA. This article treats the provisions of the two acts in 
three sections for purposes of exposition and comparison. First, this arti-
cle considers the provisions that describe the forms of fraudulent trans-
Zinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of 
Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAw. 977 (1984) (criticizing Durrett as disruptive to real estate financing). 
72. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 71, at 978-79. See In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426 
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 
(1984) (concluding that Durrett language creates 70% rule). But see Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. 
Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (concluding that Durrett only 
created 57.7% rule). 
73. 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984). In order to affirm the decision of the bankruptcy appellate panel, the 
court of appeals held that the foreclosure sale was not a "transfer" for purposes of section 548, and 
that the transfer occurred at the time the trust deed was perfected, thus precluding the creditor's 
challenge as beyond the limitations period. 725 F .2d at 1199. 
74. 21 Bankr. at 426-27. See also In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc., 23 Bankr. 36 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (the circumstances of a foreclosure sale ensure that the price obtained is an 
accurate indicator of the value of the debtor's property). 
75. See supra note 71. 
76. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 10, § 62 (UFCA leaves many rules and ideas untouched; practi-
tioner must take note of local diversities and judicial rules). 
77. See Comment, supra note 51, at 495 (discussing conflicting constructions of UFCA's good 
faith requirement); Comment, Fraudulent Conveyances--Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act-Fair 
Consideration, 1938 WIS. L. REV. 341 (comparing divergent interpretations of Act's fair considera-
tion definition). 
78. See U.F.T.A. Prefatory Note. 
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fers. The article then reviews the remedies provided to defrauded 
creditors by the UFT A and UFCA. Finally, the article considers the 
rights and liabilities of fraudulent transferees under both acts. 
A. Transactions in Fraud of Creditors 
1. Intent to Hinder, Delay, or Defraud 
The new Act continues the UFCA rule proscribing transactions exe-
cuted with an actual, subjective intent to hinder, delay, or defraud credi-
tors.79 The UFTA, however, acknowledges the usefulness of objective 
criteria by listing a number of appropriate factors that courts may con-
sider in assessing the debtor's and its transferee's subjective intent. 80 The 
factors correspond closely to the common law badges of fraud which 
courts applied under the UFCA to create a presumption of fraudulent 
intent.81 In the UFfA these factors are mere relevant evidence, how-
ever, and not presumptions.82 The UFTA comments encourage courts to 
consider any circumstantial evidence that negates the existence of 
fraud. 83 
The new Act maintains the UFCA distinction between creditors 
whose claims have matured at the time a suspect transaction occurs 
(present creditors) and those whose claims arise after the transaction but 
before the fraudulent transfer action begins (future creditors).84 Both 
present and future creditors may challenge transfers intended to hinder, 
delay, or defraud. 85 The new Act follows the Statute of Elizabeth and 
UFCA rationale that actual, fraudulent intent represents a higher degree 
of culpability and justifies a larger class of potential plaintiffs. 86 
2. Sufficiency of Consideration Received by Debtor 
Both the UFT A and UFCA deem certain transactions fraudulent 
solely because objective factors indicate that the rights of unsecured cred-
79. See id. § 4(a)(l). UFCA section 7 provides: "Every conveyance made and every obligation 
incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." 
U.F.C.A. § 7. 
80. See U.F.T.A. § 4(b). 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 13-29. 
82. See U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 5. 
83. See id. at comment 6. 
84. The major organizational change of the UFf A reflects this distinction: the types of fraud 
actionable under the Act are divided into those challengeable by present and future creditors and 
those that present creditors may attack alone. Compare U.F.C.A. §§ 4-8 (providing individually 
which particular creditors may challenge the various types of fraudulent transactions) with U.F.T.A. 
§§ 4, 5. 
85. See U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(l). 
86. Compare id. with 13 Eliz., ch., 5 § II and U.F.C.A. § 7. 
Stronger evidence of fraud is required in a case brought by a subsequent creditor because ordi-
narily a person is free to dispose of his property as he sees fit if he is not indebted at the time. 
Therefore a subsequent creditor must prove actual fraud in the conveyance rather than mere 
constructive fraud which is usually held to be sufficient in the case of an existing creditor. 
Coleman v. Alderman, 357 Mo. 758, 760, 210 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1948). 
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itors have been prejudiced. The acts consider these constructively fraud-
ulent transfers sufficiently harmful to unsecured creditors to justify 
avoidance of a transaction, regardless of the actual intent of the debtor 
and its transferee. A creditor challenging a transaction as constructively 
fraudulent must show that the transfer was made or the obligation in-
curred for insufficient consideration. 87 The UFCA's "fair consideration" 
definition has involved a two-part test that appraises the value received 
by the debtor as well as the good faith of the transferee. 88 In early 
UFCA cases, courts looked almost entirely to the value given to the 
debtor and rarely considered the intentions of the parties. 89 More re-
cently, courts deciding cases under the Act have focused on the trans-
feree's good faith and ignored the sufficiency of the consideration 
received.90 As a result, courts have avoided preferential transfers which 
normally are avoidable only in a bankruptcy proceeding.91 
The UFT A drafters have removed the issue of the transferee's good 
faith froll). the constructive fraud calculus, focusing instead on the 
debtor's receipt of reasonably equivalent value.92 Transferees may prove 
their good faith as a defense to the avoidance action. 93 The new Act fails 
to define reasonably equivalent value, but instead adopts the Bankruptcy 
Code's general approach to the concept. 94 Decisions construing the 
bankruptcy definition of value do not offer certainty or predictability, 
however, as courts have concluded that the fact finder must have consid-
erable discretion. 95 The case law does not establish a fixed percentage or 
87. Compare U.F.C.A. §§ 4-6 (requiring proof of less than "fair consideration") with U.F.T.A. 
§§ 4(a)(2), 5 (requiring proof of less than "reasonably equivalent value"). 
88. See U.F.C.A. § 3. "Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation, (a) When in 
exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is 
conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied .. . . " ld. 
89. Comment, supra note 51, at 499-502. See, e.g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 
13 Ariz. App. 431,436,477 P.2d 550, 555 (1970) (requiring only a "reasonable and fair proportion" 
of value); Schlecht v. Schlecht, 168 Minn. 168, 172, 209 N.W. 883, 885 (1926) (requiring only a "fair 
and adequate" value); Osawa v. Onishi, 33 Wash. 2d 546, 558, 206 P.2d 498, 504 (1949) (considering 
only whether conveyance rendered debtor "execution proor'). 
90. See. e.g., Spear v. Spear, 101 Misc. 2d 341, 421 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (invalidating 
bona fide confession of judgment to debtor's girlfriend, when she apparently knew that transaction 
would hinder other creditors); Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585 
(1971) (invalidating mortgage to secure a genuine debt to debtor's attorney, when attorney knew 
debtor was near financial collapse). 
91. Comment, supra note 51, at 502-03. Certain preferential transfers may be invalid under 
section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 
(West Supp. 1985); Johnson-Baillie Shoe Co. v. Bardsley, Elmer & Nichols, 237 F. 763, 767 (8th Cir. 
1916) (debtor has right to pay one creditor in preference to others until commencement of bank-
ruptcy proceedings); Canright v. General Fin. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 841, 843-44 (E.D. Ill. 1940), affd, 
123 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1941) (preference is not an evil act in itself, but one prohibited by Bankruptcy 
Act); Abeken v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 170, 172 (E.D. Mo. 1939) ("Aside from the Bankruptcy 
Act, a creditor may be preferred by a debtor."). 
92. See U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(2) & 5(a). 
93. See id. § 8(a). 
94. The UFTA provides a general, nonexclusive definition of ''value," adopted from 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(d)(2)(A) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). U.F.T.A. § 3 
comment 2. 
95. 4 COLLIER, supra note 47, 11 548.09, at 548-100 ("courts have not been too exacting in 
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safe harbor but indicates that courts will consider the circumstances at-
tending the particular transaction, the type of value exchanged, and the 
equitable posture of the parties to the transfer.96 
The prior uniform law has distinguished between transactions in 
which the debtor transfers outright ownership, a sale, and those transac-
tions that create a security interest in the debtor's property.97 In a sales 
transaction the UFCA has required that the debtor receive a "fair 
equivalent."98 In secured transactions, however, the old Act focused on 
the difference between the value of the debtor's encumbered property and 
the amount received by the debtor. 99 When the amount of the loan to the 
debtor was "not disproportionately small," a court would enforce the 
obligation incurred. 100 Despite this more relaxed standard, courts often 
have invalidated secured transactions under the UFCA. 101 The com-
ments to the new Act recognize that those decisions have ignored the fact 
that a lender's interest in secured property may not exceed the amount of 
the debt, leaving the remainder of the debtor's property, the equity, avail-
able to unsecured creditors. 102 The UFf A does not continue the double 
standard, but recognizes that the amount of the secured debt is the mea-
sure of the debtor's obligation. 103 Although the delay caused when a 
secured creditor satisfies a claim against a debtor's property may preju-
dice unsecured creditors, the UFr A follows Article 9 of the UCC104 and 
subordinates the interests of unsecured creditors to those of secured cred-
itors in this situation. The new Act, however, leaves open the possibility 
applying the criterion"). See Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (allowing consider-
ation of debtor's need for challenged loan and ability to obtain loan elsewhere as well as value of 
securities transferred in exchange for loan); accord, Roth v. Fabrikant Bros., 175 F .2d 665 (2d Cir. 
1949); Security Discount Co. v. Wesner (In re Peoria Braumeister Co.), 138 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 
1943); Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Schenecker, 289 Pa. 277, 137 A. 272 (1927). 
96. 4 COLLIER, supra note 47, ~ 548.09. 
97. Compare U.F.C.A. § 3(a): "Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation, (a) 
When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, 
property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied ... " with § 3(b): "When such property, or 
obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not 
disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained." 
98. See id. § 3(a). See also Willoughby v. King, 21 Ariz. App. 589, 522 P.2d 54 (1974) (exam-
ining financial factors for fair equivalence); Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92 Utah 577, 
70 P.2d 738 (1952) (defining fair equivalence not as a fixed, precise measure but in light of value of 
property at time of conveyance); Farmers' Exchange Bank v. Oneida Motor Truck Co., 202 Wis. 
266, 232 N.W. 536 (1930) (explaining that fair equivalence may constitute cash or a hardship or 
obligation undertaken by the debtor's purchaser). 
99. See U.F.C.A. § 3(b). 
100. See, e.g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 471 P.2d 550 
( 1970) (finding difference between $11,000 antecedent debt and mortgaged property worth $25,000 
was disproportionately small); Trust Co. of Orange v. Garfinkel, 107 N.J. Eq. 20, 151 A. 858 (1930) 
(deciding debt of $15,000 was fair consideration for stock worth little more, if anything); Wirtz v. 
Jensen (In re Rasmussen's Estate), 238 Wis. 334, 298 N.W. 172 (1941) (voiding security transaction 
as Jacking fair consideration when property mortgaged was worth several times the amount of ante-
cedent debt). 
10 I. See supra note l 00. 
102. See U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 3. 
103. See id. § 3 comment 3, § 4 comment 3. 
104. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1978). 
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that the size of the difference between the amount of the debt and the 
value of the collateral may indicate an intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud. 105 
Courts construing the UFCA have concluded that an executory 
promise is not within the Act's definition of fair consideration. 106 Courts 
have rejected some promises to discharge the debtor's obligations or to 
support the debtor for life as inadequate value. 107 Other UFCA deci-
sions, however, have reached the opposite result. 108 The new Act strikes 
a balance: executory promises made in the ordinary course of business 
may serve as consideration sufficient to allow a transfer. 109 Therefore, a 
professional builder's promise to make repairs, a farmer's promise to 
continue working on a parent's farm for the remainder of the parent's 
life, or an assumption of debts may support transfers of the debtor's 
property under the new Act. The UFT A's expressed policy is to assess 
value from the viewpoint of the particular debtor's unsecured creditors 
and to focus upon the overall diminution of the debtor's estate. 110 
The drafters of the UFT A respond to the Durrett issue--whether a 
court may invalidate a foreclosure sale of secured collateral because the 
sale realized an inadequate price111-in the definition of value. The new 
Act conclusively presumes that the value received is sufficient when the 
parties transfer property "pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollu-
sive foreclosure sale or execution of power of sale."112 The basis for this 
provision is the rationale that a foreclosure sale provides the most accu-
rate means to establish the collateral's fair value. 113 Neither the new Act 
nor the comments elaborate on what constitutes a regularly conducted, 
noncollusive sale. 114 
105. See U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2. 
106. See, e.g., Hulsether v. Sanders, 54 S.D. 412, 223 N .W. 335 (1929) (promise to discharge 
mortgage and support debtor held insufficient); Angers v. Sabatinelli, 235 Wis. 422, 293 N.W. 173 
(1940) (interpreting section to exclude any executory promise not embodied in a negotiable instru-
ment already negotiated to a holder in due course). See also McLaughlin, supra note 39, at 414-15 
(concluding that executory promise is not fair consideration under unequivocal language of UFCA 
§ 3). The Bankruptcy Code takes the more restrictive view that a promise of future support does not 
constitute value. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(2)(A) 
(West Supp. 1985). 
107. See, e.g., Sandler v. Parliapiano, 236 A.D. 70, 258 N.Y.S. 88 (1932) (promise of future 
support held insufficient); Cooper v. Cooper, 22 Tenn. App. 473, 124 S.W.2d 264 (1938) (promise to 
pay criminal judgment, support for life, and pay for funeral expenses held insufficient). 
108. See, e.g., Freitag v. Strand of Atlantic City, Inc., 205 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1953) (finding that 
executory promise may be "property" and "fair consideration"); Hollander v. Gautier, 114 N.J. Eq. 
485, 168 A. 860 (1933) (deciding enforceable promise may constitute fair consideration under 
UFCA). See also Note, Rights of Creditors in Property Conveyed in Consideration of Future Support, 
45 IOWA L. REv. 546, 550-62 (1960). 
109. See U.F.T.A. § 3(a). 
110. See id. § 3 comment 2. 
111. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
112. U.F.T.A. § 3(b). 
113. /d. § 3 comment 5 (citing 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1227 (1965)). 
114. Nor does In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 125 
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Once a creditor establishes that the consideration received by the 
debtor was inadequate, the creditor must prove additional factors to in-
validate a transaction as constructively fraudulent. The three forms of 
constructive fraud which the UFf A incorporates from the prior uniform 
law emphasize verifiable indicia of the debtor's fiscal welfare. 
a. Transfers Made By An Insolvent Debtor 
Under the UFT A present creditors may avoid transfers when the 
_ debtor/transferor has received inadequate consideration from the trans-
feree and the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or has been 
rendered insolvent as a result of the transfer. 115 The bona fides of the 
debtor and transferee are not pertinent. 116 This rule was a major innova-
tion117 of the UFCA and continues in the new Act with an expanded 
definition of insolvency118 to help creditors prove and courts determine 
when a debtor is insolvent.l 19 The UFT A provides a simplified version 
of the UFCA's "balance sheet" test for insolvency: the new Act com-
pares the value of the debtor's liabilities to the value of the debtor's as-
sets.l20 The definition of assets121 is expansive and includes unliquidated 
and contingent claims which are beyond the reach of creditors. 122 
The UFT A also adopts the "equitable" test of insolvency: a debtor 
is insolvent when the debtor generally is not paying its debts as they 
mature. 123 The presumption of insolvency under this test is rebuttable; 
the burden of proving the debtor's solvency shifts to the debtor or trans-
feree.124 This equitable test for insolvency contemplates an inquiry into 
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984), the case whose rationale is adopted in 
section 3(b), define these terms. See infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text. 
115. See U .F.T.A. § 5(a). 
116. See id. § 2; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Hoffines, 429 Pa. 109, 239 A.2d 458 (1968) (ques-
tion of actual intent drops out of case) (construing UFCA § 4 which is identical to UFTA § 5(a)). 
117. See Radin, supra note 44, at 8 (major aspect of UFCA eliminates any notion of estoppel or 
reliance in declaring prejudicial transactions fraudulent as to creditors); U.F.C.A. Prefatory Note 
(Act was drafted to remove all possibilities of legal presumptions of intent). 
118. See U.F.T.A. § 2(a). In comparison, the UFCA provides that "[a] person is insolvent 
when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay 
his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured." U.F .C.A. § 2(1). 
119. See U.F.T.A. § 2(a). The UFTA adopts a similar definition from the Bankruptcy Code to 
determine when a partnership is insolvent. See id. § 2(c) (adapted from 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(8) 
(1982)). 
120. See U.F.T.A. § 2(a). 
121. The UFTA defines assets simply as "property of a debtor," subject to exemptions or en-
cumbrances by a valid lien. U.F.T.A. § 1(2). 
122. See id. § 1 comment 2. The UFTA definition does not require that an asset be available to 
discharge the debtor's debts. Accordingly, although creditors may not levy execution on and sell an 
unliquidated tort claim, courts may include the claim as an asset of the debtor for purposes of 
determining whether the debtor is solvent. /d. (citing Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. 
Goldman, 578 F.2d 904, 907-09 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
123. See U.F.T.A. § 2(b). The UFTA adopts the equitable test from the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 303(h)(l) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h){l) (West Supp. 1985), and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 1-201{23) (1978). 
124. The party seeking to uphold the transfer must prove that it is more probable than not that 
the debtor was solvent. U.F.T.A. § 2 comment 2. 
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the circumstances of each particular debtor, considering such factors as 
the number of accounts payable, the percentage unpaid, the age of the 
accounts, and any good faith disputes or other circumstances which 
might account for nonpayment. 125 
b. Unreasonably Small Assets 
The UFT A allows both present and future creditors to avoid a 
transfer made by a business debtor for inadequate consideration when 
the transfer left the debtor with "unreasonably small assets." 126 The par-
allel UFCA provision refers to "unreasonably small capita/." 127 The 
UFT A drafting committee explains that the connotation of "capital" in 
corporation law has created uncertainty over which assets of the debtor 
courts should consider. 128 In addition, the basis of a capital or stock 
valuation is uncertain, as the term may anticipate par value, market 
value, or the consideration received for stock issued.129 The drafters of 
the UFI A intend to focus attention on commercial realities. Therefore, 
the total market value of the debtor's assets is measured "in light of the 
needs of the business or transaction in which the debtor was engaged or 
about to engage."130 
c. Debtor's Accumulation of Debts Beyond Its Ability to Pay 
The UFTA retains the UFCA rule131 permitting present and future 
creditors to avoid transfers for inadequate consideration when the debtor 
intends through the transfer to incur debts beyond its ability to pay}32 
In states which have adopted the UFCA, creditors generally have as-
serted claims that the debtor entered into a transaction with the intent to 
incur debts beyond its ability to pay along with allegations of intentional 
fraud. 133 Because the cases have broadly construed the intentional fraud 
rule 134-intent to hinder, delay, or defraud-the intent to incur debts 
125. /d. 
126. See id. § 4(a)(2)(i). 
127. Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making it is engaged 
or is about to engage in a business or transaction for which the property remaining in his hands 
after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to 
other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or transaction 
without regard to his actual intent. 
U.F.C.A. § 5 (emphasis added). 
128. See U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 4. 
129. See id. 
130. /d. 
131. "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair consideration when 
the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or believes that he will 
incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors." U.F.C.A. § 6. 
132. See U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(ii). 
133. See, e.g. , Oakford Realty Co. v. Boarman, 156 Md. 65, 143 A. 644 (1928) (holding that 
both § 6 and the intentional fraud section of UFCA (§ 7) require proof of an intention to defraud 
creditors); Hartnett v. Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S.W.2d 227 (1933) (invalidating transfer upon 
proof that debtor intended to accumulate debts and to defraud creditors). 
134. See. e.g., Klein v. Rossi, 251 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (intentional fraud held to extend 
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prov1s1on complements rather than expands the theories available to 
creditors asserting a fraudulent conveyance claim. The UFT A formula-
tion, however, may make a difference because it proscribes transfers for 
inadequate consideration when the debtor has reason to believe that the 
debtor will incur debts beyond its ability to pay.135 Reference to a rea-
sonableness standard as well as actual intent may expose more suspect 
transactions. 
3. Preferential Transfers 
The UFT A invalidates preferential transfers to an insider to satisfy 
an antecedent debt when the debtor was insolvent and the insider had 
reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 136 This innovation is 
available only to present creditors. 137 Adopted from the Bankruptcy 
Code, 138 the insider definition is nonexclusive and includes virtually any-
one in a position to control the debtor. 139 
Once creditors whose claims arose before the suspect transaction es-
tablish that the transferee was an insider, these creditors may challenge 
the transfer whether or not satisfaction of the antecedent debt represents 
less than reasonably equivalent value for the debtor's property.140 The 
UFT A provision expressly is inapplicable when the debtor receives new 
value from the insider. 141 If an insider lends money to a debtor in ex-
change for the satisfaction of an antecedent debt, but also takes security 
for that loan, then the insider has given no new value to insulate the 
transaction from the insider preference rule. 142 Insiders may assert de-
fensively, however, that the transfer occurred in the ordinary course of 
business between the insider and debtor, or that at least a portion of the 
consideration paid to the debtor is new value given in a good faith at-
tempt to rehabilitate the debtor. 143 
B. Rights of Defrauded Creditors 
Defrauded creditors may pursue one or more of several options 
under the UFT A, depending upon the posture of their particular claims. 
The creditor may request that the court set aside the fraudulent transfer, 
enjoin the transferee currently holding the property from removing it 
to any act intended to hinder or delay unsecured creditors); Southern Indus., Inc. v. Jeremias, 66 
A.D.2d 178, 411 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1978) (defining a fraudulent conveyance as failure to deal honestly, 
fairly, and openly); Continental Bank v. Marcus, 242 Pa. Super. 371, 363 A.2d 1318 (1976) (finding 
that actual intent may be proved through circumstantial evidence). 
135. See U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(ii). 
136. See id. § S(b). 
137. See id. 
138. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (West Supp. 1985). 
139. See U.F.T.A. § 1(7), § 1 comment 7. 
140. See id. § 5(b). 
141. See id. § 8(f)(1). Given the provision's focus on antecedent debt, that clarification seems 
tautological. 
142. /d. § 8(t)(3). 
143. /d. § 8(t)(2), (3). 
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from the reach of the creditor, or appoint a custodian of the property. 144 
Under the UFCA, only creditors with unmatured claims could request a 
court to enjoin a transfer or appoint a receiver to protect the property 
until the creditors' claims matured. 145 Decisions construing the UFCA, 
however, have ignored the distinction and have granted anticipatory as 
well as present relief to all creditors. 146 The UFIA officially eliminates 
the "confusing and unnecessary distinction between matured and unma-
tured claims, allowing any creditor to pursue any of the above forms of 
relief."147 Under both acts a judgment creditor also may disregard a 
fraudulent transaction and directly attach or levy execution on the fraud-
ulently transferred property. 148 Even though the judgment creditor may 
pursue this alternative, practical considerations may discourage actions 
against the property before the fraudulent transfer is set aside. When a 
court finds, after attachment, that a challenged conveyance was not in 
fact fraudulent, an impatient creditor could face tort liability for wrong-
ful attachment or conversion. 149 On the other hand, the UFf A permits 
a defrauded creditor to seek a money judgment from any transferee of 
the debtor's property.l50 If the transferee has dissipated the property, 
creditors cannot locate the property, or the property is otherwise beyond 
the reach of creditors, a creditor may attempt to satisfy a claim from any 
144. See id. § 7(a). 
145. Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Matured. 
(I) Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his 
claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without 
knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or 
mediately from such a purchaser, 
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annuled to the extent necessary to 
satisfy his claim, or 
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property 
conveyed. 
U.F.C.A. § 9. 
Rights of Creditors Whose Claims Have Not Matured. 
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim 
has not matured, he may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction against any person against 
whom he could have proceeded had his claim matured, and the court may, 
(a) Restrain. the defendant from disposing of his property, 
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property, 
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or 
{d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require. 
/d. § 10. 
146. See, e.g., Lipskey v. Voloshen, 155 Md. 139, 141 A. 402 {1928) (granting injunction to 
judgment creditor); Matthews v. Schusheim, 36 Misc. 2d 918, 235 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1962) 
(granting injunction and allowing receiver without regard to maturity of claim); Oliphant v. Moore, 
155 Tenn. 359, 293 S.W. 541 (1927) (granting injunction to tort judgment creditor). 
147. See U.F.T.A. Prefatory Note. 
148. Compare id. § 7(b) with U.F.C.A. § 9(b). 
149. See Rice v. Wood, 61 Ark. 442, 33 S.W. 636 (1896) (holding creditor liable for obtaining 
attachment of property not belonging to debtor); Dyett v. Hyman, 129 N.Y. 351, 29 N.E. 261 (1891) 
(creditors who attached property after alleged fraudulent conveyance held liable for wrongful attach-
ment; court upheld underlying transaction as valid}; Peterson v. Wiesner, 62 Nev. 184, 146 P.2d 789 
(1944) (permitting owner of property wrongfully attached to recover for wrongful deprivation of 
property). 
ISO. See U.F.T.A. § 8(b)(2). 
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party who received the property after the fraudulent transaction. 151 The 
UFfA limits the right to recover a money judgment to the lesser of the 
transferred property value or the amount of the creditor's claim.152 
The UFf A remedies do not limit the other common law or statu-
tory remedies available to a defrauded unsecured creditor. 153 The 
UFf A, like the prior uniform Act, merely provides an additional remedy 
to the wronged unsecured creditor. 154 
C Rights of Transferees 
The UFf A protects good faith purchasers for value. 155 This protec-
tion is available even when the debtor's subjective intent is malicious and 
fraudulent. 156 When the transferee gives inadequate consideration for a 
debtor's property, the new Act prot~cts the good faith transferee to the 
extent of the value actually given to the debtor. 157 This partial protection 
151. Jd. 
152. Jd. § 8(b). The UFTA calculates property value from the time of transfer, subject to equi-
table adjustment. See id. § 8(c). 
153. See id. § 1 comment 2, § 4 comment 8. 
154. Courts have interpreted the UFCA to leave the law of bulk sales intact (see Keedy v. 
Sterling Elec. Appliance Co., 13 Del. Ch. 66, 115 A. 359 (1921); Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co. v. 
Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 A. 355 (1928); Lewis Brown Co. v. Mallory, 8 Tenn. App. 36 (1928)), to 
leave a state bulk mortgages law intact (see Rice v. Katz, 255 Mich. 1, 237 N.W. 27 (1931)), and to 
uphold the common law doctrine of fraudulent retention of possession (see American S.S. Co. v. 
Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F.2d 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), affd, 49 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1931); Wight-
man v. King, 31 Ariz. 89, 250 P. 772 (1926); Ship1er v. New Castle Paper Prods. Corp., 293 Pa. 412, 
143 A. 182 (1928)). 
The UFT A also clarifies the rights of creditors by providing, for the first time, a statute of 
limitations, see U.F.T.A. § 9, and a means to calculate when the period of limitations should begin, 
see id. § 6. The new Act supplies a general four-year limitation period, subject to two exceptions. 
First, creditors may bring intentional fraud claims within one year of the fraud's discovery if that 
time is outside the general limitation period. Second, creditors may challenge preferential transfers 
to insiders only within a one-year period. See id. The UFf A adopted the formulas for determining 
the "time of transfer" (when to begin running of the limitation period) from section 548(d)(l) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(l) (1982), amended in II U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(1) (West Supp. 
1985). The time of transfer in real property transactions is the time of recordation. U.F.T.A. 
§ 6(1)(i) comment I. For personal property and fixtures transactions, the transfer occurs at notice 
filing or delivery of physical possession. ld. § 6(l)(ii) comment I. When the parties fail to perfect 
transactions that the parties could have perfected by one of the above means, the UFT A deems the 
transaction to have taken place immediately before an action to set aside the fraudulent conveyance 
commenced. /d. § 6(2). The UFT A provides that all other transfers occur when the transaction 
becomes effective between the parties themselves. Id. § 6(3). 
155. See U.F.T.A. § 8(a). The UFCA provides identical protection. Defrauded creditors may 
recover "against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud 
at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a 
purchaser." U.F.C.A. § 9. 
156. See Shay v. Gagne, 275 Mass. 386, 393, 176 N.E. 200, 202 (1931) (refusing to set aside 
challenged mortgage when mortgagee did not participate in debtor's fraudulent intent); Berger v. Hi-
Gear Tire & Auto Supply, Inc., 257 Md. 470, 475, 263 A.2d 507, 510 (1970) (finding that debtor's 
fraudulent intent will not vitiate transaction unless grantee participates in fraudulent intent); Bolten 
v. Colburn, 389 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo. App. 1965) (purchaser from fraudulent debtor protected 
when the purchaser buys without notice of intent and for valuable consideration). 
157. See U.F.T.A. § 8(d). The UFCA provided similar partial protection for good faith pur-
chasers. U.F.C.A. § 9(2). See Merchants Discount Co. v. Esther Abelson, Inc., 297 Mass. 517, 520, 
9 N.E.2d 528, 531 ( 1937) (innocent purchaser protected to amount of consideration paid); Osawa v. 
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may take the form of a lien on the property transferred or a reduced 
judgment against the transferee. 158 The UFT A protects a good faith 
transferee who has not given reasonably equivalent value by enforcing 
the debtor's obligation to the transferee only to the extent of value given 
the debtor! 59 The UFTA protection of good faith transferees for value 
also is available for subsequent transferees that did not deal directly with 
the debtor. 160 The UFTA derived the provision protecting subsequent 
transferees from section 550(b)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code!61 Congress 
has interpreted the bankruptcy provision as precluding a fraudulent 
transferee from "laundering" a debtor's property through an innocent 
party.162 Subsequent transferees under the bankruptcy provision each 
must prove good faith to avoid liability!63 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE UFT A TO ISSUES IMPLICATED IN 
PARTICULAR COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
Because it adopts and occasionally reformulates several bodies of 
fraud law, the UFTA is to some extent a patchwork. The first portion of 
this article has described how the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 inspired the UFT A. Drafters of uniform law should consult 
and incorporate established commercial concepts; they should not 
reinvent the wheel at each opportunity. But patchwork legislation has its 
dangers. The incongruities and inconsistencies of existing law may un-
dermine coherent application of new law. As the drafters of the UCC 
recognized, the successful promulgation of new legislation may require 
that the drafters abandon the language and formulations of the existing 
law to effectuate the needs of the commercial community. Professor 
Frederick Beutel criticized the UCC for its variety of new and unfamiliar 
terms. 164 Professor Grant Gilmore, one of the drafters of the Code, re-
Onishi, 33 Wash. 2d 546, 558-59, 206 P.2d 498, 505 (1949) (good faith purchaser recovers amount 
paid from interpleader fund) . 
158. U.F.T.A. § 8(d)(1), (3). 
159. /d. § 8(d)(2). 
160. See id. § 8(b)(2). 
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(l) (1982). 
162. E.g., 4 COLLIER, supra note 47, ~ 550.03, at 550-10 (citing Analysis of H.R. 8200, H. REP. 
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977); Analysis ofS. 2266, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
90 (1978)). 
163. See id; Coleman v. Home Savings Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 836 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982). 
164. See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [7] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE 
L.J. 334, 337-48 (1952) ("If the needs ofthe regulation of commerce required it, lawyers, courts and 
business men could probably learn this new vocabulary. It would perhaps take a period of twenty-
five or fifty years of confusion .... " /d. at 348). Commentators more recently have directed 
criticism toward the proposed New Uniform Payments Code, New Uniform Payments Code (Perm. 
Editorial Bd. Draft No. 3, 1983), which would revise Articles 3 & 4 of the UCC. See Geary, One 
Size Doesn't Fit All-Is a Uniform Payments Code a Good Idea?, 9 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. 
L.J. 337, 341 (1983) ("[H]aving mastered these legal1anguages, should we all now be forced to forget 
them and learn Esperanto?"). But see Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True Codification 
of Payments Law, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 103 (1984) (arguing that "[c]ommercial attorneys have 
been willing to relearn" where beneficial new legislation is involved) (citing Llewellyn, Why We Need 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 367, 368 (1957)). 
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sponded that the new terminology would not alter established commer-
cial practices as much as the terminology would clarify troublesome 
problem areas and avoid the unfortunate baggage attending some of the 
terms under pre-Code law. 165 This section of the article fo~uses on the 
language of the UFf A and the new Act's adoption of concepts from 
other bodies of commercial law. 
This effort does not attempt to appraise the ultimate success or fail-
ure of the UFf A project. Indeed, nearly thirty years after the final draft 
of the UCC the debate over the success of that jurisprudential experi-
ment persists. 166 Nonetheless, as situations conducive to fraudulent 
transfer analysis confront courts and legislative bodies, some observa-
tions regarding the new uniform Act's provisions may guide the interpre-
tive process and inform the debate over the desirability of the UFf A's 
formulation of fraudulent transfer law. This section of the article exam-
ines specific provisions of the UFf A. to consider the statute's essential 
characteristics. The reader who appreciates the manner in which the 
drafters drew distinctions and accentuated similarities has the frame of 
reference to construe the UFf A's provisions. 
The drafters of the new Act identify the crucial concept upon which 
the law of fraudulent transactions is premised: "the purpose of the Act 
[is] to protect a debtor's estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the 
debtor's unsecured creditors." 167 That purpose is not the exclusive prov-
ince of the UFf A or its predecessor statute. The preference provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code proscribed transfers which operate "to the preju-
dice of other creditors holding unsecured claims .... " 168 Succinctly, 
fraudulent transfer law endeavors to regulate nothing more. To conclude 
that fraudulent transfer legislation absolutely penalizes debtor actions 
which benefit some creditors at the expense of others would be to over-
simplify; the necessary accommodation of competing financial interests 
and freedom of contract principles assures the continued integrity of 
165. See Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 
364, 379 (1952). See also id. at 367 ("[There] are novel terms [in the UCC]: they have not previ-
ously been statutory words of art. On the other hand it would be hard to imagine that either a 
businessman or a lawyer would find them 'strange ... technical and exotic."') (quoting Beutel, 
supra note 164, at 337-38). 
166. Compare Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 621,635 (1975) ("This derogation of the legislative function [implicit in the UCC) 
appears to be premised on . . . (a] triad of dubious assumptions . . . .") with Winship, Jurispru-
dence and the Uniform Commercial Code: A "Commote," 31 Sw. L.J. 843, 866 (1977) (in which 
Professor Winship, having reviewed Professor Danzig's effort, concludes that " Danzig's dichotomy 
between the proper roles for courts and legislatures oversimplifies both Llewellyn's approach to 
semi-permanent legislation and the characteristics of the provisions of article 11."). Other examples 
of the debate over the success of the UCC are available. See, e.g., Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of 
which Karl N. Llewellyn is the Hero of the Piece; or Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's 
Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 139 (1970); Leff, Unconscionability and the 
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967). 
167. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2. 
168. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985). See 
infra note 197 for a reproduction of section 547(c). 
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many transactions which some affected third parties would reasonably 
conclude are prejudicial to their best interests. 
A statutory proscription of particular transactions or of transactions 
with particular consequences must offer a catalog of indicia to signal reli-
ably those transfers that invidiously sacrifice some interests in favor of 
others. The laws must hold the "dirty guys" in without unduly inhib-
iting the regularity and predictability of commercial transactions. 169 
Achieving the best balance of general and specific terminology to assure 
commercially reasonable results is a significant challenge. The UFf A 
can be no better than the drafters' success in achieving the balance; the 
new Act suffers most when general policies are sacrificed for the pyrrhic 
security of overspecification. 
A. Specificity and Generalization 
Like too many "matters legal," 170 courts and commentators can 
sense fraud more easily than define it. 171 As noted above, the drafters of 
fraud law agree on its purpose-avoiding transactions which prejudice 
the interests of unsecured creditors. How best to effectuate that purpose, 
however, is unclear. The UFf A approaches the challenge from two per-
spectives. The Act generalizes by means of broad definition and specifies 
by reference to more precise indicia. This article suggests that the UFf A 
may change the law without improving it because the new Act lacks in-
ternal consistency. The new uniform law vacillates when treating certain 
transactions and fails to achieve the proper balance of the general and the 
specific to assure coherent, consistent application of the Act's provisions. 
1. Generalization: The UFTA Concept of "Transfer" 
The UFfA offers a broad definition of "transfer," 172 designed such 
that courts may apply the Act's avoidance mechanisms to virtually any 
type of transaction which could prejudice unsecured creditors. Section 6 
of the UFfA, which designates the time at which a transfer is made or 
an obligation incurred, complements well the broad section 1(12) defini-
169. See Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 782 (1953). As Llewel-
lyn himself more stylishly put it: 
The way to write good law is to indicate what you want to do, and you assume within reason 
that the persons the law deals with will try to be decent; then after that, you lay down the edges 
to take care of the dirty guys and try to hold them in, which means that every statute ought to 
have two essential bases, one to show you where the law wants you to go, and one to show 
where we will put you if you don't. 
ld. (quoted in Carroll, supra note 166, at 152). 
170. Llewellyn was suspicious of any attempt to frame all-inclusive definitions of "law." SeeK. 
LLEWELLYN, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE 3-5 (1962) ("I have no 
desire to exclude anything from matters legal." Jd. at 4). 
171. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today 
attempt further to define [hard-core pornography) .... But I know it when I see it . .. . ");Letter 
from Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaims, supra note 2 and accompanying text (in which Lord Hard-
wicke despairs of framing any legal definition of fraud). 
172. See U.F.T.A. § 1(12). 
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tion of transfer. 173 As discussed above, 174 the comprehensiveness of the 
transfer concept made possible the fraudulent conveyance analysis of the 
Durrett line of cases. Comment 12 to UFfA section 1(12) acknowledges 
that the Act's definition "is derived principally from § 101 [48] of the 
Bankruptcy Code," 175 and further explains that the Code's definition is 
no less comprehensive than that of the UFCA. Courts have held that the 
UFCA definition includes involuntary transfers such as foreclosure sales 
in several cited cases. 176 
So long as the new Act's provisions reach involuntary transfers of 
the debtor's assets, the Durrett analysis retains its vitality. In UFfA sec-
tion 3(b ), clarifying the reasonably equivalent value concept, the drafters 
try· to avoid the Durrett result explicitly by providing that transfers "pur-
suant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale" 177 are nec-
essarily transfers for reasonably equivalent value. The drafters are 
comfortable, then, in concluding that a regularly conducted foreclosure 
sale could not, as a matter of law, deplete the debtor's estate to the preju-
dice of the debtor's unsecured creditors. Creative counsel and judges, 
however, may construe the ffregu/arly conducted, noncol/usive" language 
of UFT A section 3(b) to reach a result similar to that accomplished by 
the Durrett rule. Counsel can argue that the sale was conducted irregu-
larly, or was collusive. If such an argument succeeds, then the provision 
would have no more effect than UCC section 9-507(2). 178 This UCC 
section admonishes that a party cannot assail an Article 9 sale of prop-
erty subject to a security interest merely because "a better price could 
173. See id. § 6. 
174. See supra notes 70-75, and 111-14 and accompanying text. 
175. U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 12; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(48) (1985). This section of the 
Bankruptcy Code states: "(48) 'transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in 
property, including retention of title as a security interest." /d. 
176. See U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 12 (citing Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N.Y. 139, 27 N.E.2d 
814 (1940); Lefkowitz v. Finkelstein Trading Corp., 14 F. Supp. 898, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Catabene 
v. Wallner, 16 N.J. Super. 597, 602, 85 A.2d 300, 302 (1951); Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 
277 A.D. 1090, 101 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 932, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951)). 
177. U.F.T.A. § 3(b); see id. § 3 comment 5 (in which the drafters state that they have rejected 
the rule of Durrett in favor of that espoused in In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), 
aff'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984)). For a discus-
sion of Madrid and Durrett, see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
178. Section 9-507(2) of the UCC provides: 
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a 
different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish 
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either 
sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the 
price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity 
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in 
a commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with 
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A disposition 
which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or 
representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this 
sentence does not indicate that any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it 
indicate that any disposition not so approved is not commercially reasonable. 
u.c.c. § 9-507(2) (1978). 
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have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method 
from that selected by the secured party." 179 In several instances, courts 
have reviewed foreclosure sales which left the debtor owing a substantial 
deficiency and have found a basis other than a low price to upset the sale. 
These courts have found ways to conclude that the sale was commer-
cially unreasonable. 180 
Although in defining transfer181 the UFf A considers all of the facts 
surrounding a conveyance of a property interest, this article skeptically 
:views the effect which courts will give the section 3(b) definition of 
value.l82 To the extent section 3(b) compromises the broad parameters 
of the transfer definition, the section may allow courts to reach a Durrett-
like result. The regression from the broad transfer definition at least is 
unfortunate and could prove inefficacious. 
2. Specification: The u/ nsider,, Transferee 
a. "Insider" Status 
The UFfA's insider definition is dichotomous. Subsection 1(7)(iv) 
provides that the term insider "includes . . . an affiliate, or an insider of 
an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor .... " 183 Section 1(1) de-
fines affiliate. 184 Because the Act uses the intention_ally nonexclusive "in-
cludes" modifier in describing what constitutes insider status, 185 
understanding why the drafters specify the intercorporate and interper-
179. /d. 
180. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Div., 540 F.2d 1375, 1381-82 (lOth 
Cir. 1976) (holding the sale of oil drilling rig commercially unreasonable in part due to a lack of 
publicity and auction irregularities, but noting the low price received as a factor); Connex Press, Inc. 
v. International Airmotive, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 51,56-57 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding the sale of large jet 
commercially unreasonable due in part to inadequate publicity, but identifying the low price received 
in sale as factor in decision), affd without opinion, 514 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Atlas Constr. Co. 
v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 124 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965) (inadequate publicity 
combined with below-market sales price established sale of truck crane as commercially unreasona· 
ble). See generally B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM· 
MERCIAL CODE ~ 4.8[8][a] (1980) (discussing the effect on courts of low foreclosure sale prices). 
Clark notes that while "a low price received at foreclosure is not fatal . . . , a low price calls for a 
close review of the facts surrounding the sale." Id at 4-66. Indeed, Clark discusses some authority 
in which courts have determined, in apparent opposition to the language of section 9-507(2), that 
receipt of a low foreclosure sale price alone can mark such a sale as commercially unreasonable. See 
id. at~ 4.8[8][b] (citing, e.g., Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. Mims, 45 Cal. App. 3d 12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
622 (1975); Family Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 587, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 647 
(Pa. Ct. C.P. 1961)). Clark cautions, however, that "[j]ust as the courts weigh the price received 
heavily when other elements of commercial unreasonableness are present, so will they frequently 
uphold a low price when the sale passes muster in all other respects." /d. at 4-68. See also AMERI· 
CAN BAR AssociATION, CONDUCTING A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE SALE OF COLLATERAL 
UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, A PANEL PRESENTATION FOR THE 
SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW (Aug. 1, 1983) (describing requisites of 
a commercially reasonable disposition). 
181. See U.F.T.A. § 1(12). 
182. See id. § 3(b). 
183. /d. § 1(7)(iv). 
184. See id. § 1(1). 
185. The UFT A follows the Bankruptcy Code and specifies that includes is not to be read in a 
limiting fashion. See U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 7 ("As in the Bankruptcy Code ... , the word ' in-
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sonal relationships which should arouse courts' suspicion in some detail 
is difficult. Courts will apply more careful scrutiny to transactions with 
relatives, general partners, 186 partnerships, directors, officers, and per-
sons in control187 of the debtor. 188 Insider transfers certainly warrant 
that treatment, but whether the UFf A drafters made the reasons requir-
ing exceptional treatment of such transactions fully operative is unclear. 
Parties in a position to compel or cajole transfer of the debtor's 
property to themselves are insiders, the parties particularly well-postured 
to receive the estate's property to the prejudice of unsecured creditors. A 
debtor will convey or transfer its property to particular third parties and 
thereby prejudice unsecured creditors, as the debtor and the transferee 
will benefit more from such an action than from an equitable disposition 
of the property. Either the debtor foresees some direct pecuniary benefit 
to itself in the transfer or prefers to benefit a particular transferee or 
group of transferees for less commercially obvious reasons. In any event, 
if the debtor transfers its assets to one creditor rather than to another 
creditor for reasons which do not reciprocally enhance the pecuniary 
value of the debtor's estate, then the transfer may be voidable because 
"[c]onsideration having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint does not 
satisfy the statutory definition [of value]."189 
As Holmes suggested, courts can draw conclusions about relevant 
subjective circumstances more confidently when the courts receive suffi-
cient objective indicia.190 Because the context is more susceptible to 
eludes' is not limiting, however."); 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1982) ('"includes' and 'including' are not 
limiting"). 
186. The UFfA, however, excludes limited partners from the insider definition. See U.F.T.A. 
§§ 1(7)(i)(C), 1(7)(ii)(E), 1(7)(iii)(D), § I comment 7. The comment states, in pertinent part, that 
while the UFf A derives its insider definition from the Bankruptcy Code, 
[t)he definition has been restricted . .. [in the UFfA) to make clear that a partner is not an 
insider of an individual, corporation, or partnership if any of these latter three persons is only a 
limited partner. The [Bankruptcy Code] definition . . . does not purport to make a limited 
partner an insider . . . , but it is susceptible of a contrary interpretation and one which would 
extend unduly the scope of the defined relationship when the limited partner is not a person in 
control of the partnership. 
/d. § 1 comment 7. See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (1985) (the Bankruptcy Code definition of "in-
sider" status). 
187. U.F.T.A. § 1(7)(iii)(E). 
188. For a discussion of the "control" concept, see Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Re-
sulting from Improper Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. 
LAW. 343 (1975). Douglas-Hamilton discusses the ways in which a court may find a creditor "in 
control" of corporate debtors, primarily in the context of federal securities law. She identifies three 
situations in which courts may find creditor liability: first, when a creditor may exercise voting 
control over the corporate debtor by having the power to elect a majority of directors (as where a 
controlling block of shares serves as loan collateral); second, when a creditor has significant control 
over the selection of the personnel who will manage the troubled debtor; and, finally, when the 
creditor can influence either the debtor's management or those persons with voting control through 
financial domination. /d. at 344-46. See also Ash & Broude, The Consequences of Lender Control, in 
LEVERAGED BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 205 (Practicing Law Institute No. 305, 1979) (citing Douglas-
Hamilton as reviving the doctrine of lender control). 
189. U.F.T.A. § 3 comment 2. 
190. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 9, at 33. ("(W]hile the law ... always, in a certain sense, 
measure[s] legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless ... is continually transmuting those 
No.3] UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 553 
overreaching and commercially unreasonable behavior, courts scrutinize 
insider transfers. Experience suggests that insiders may take undue ad-
vantage of unsecured creditor's interests. 191 If the substance of and rea-
son for the insider and affiliate formulations in the UFf A is this 
subjective idea of undue advantage, then the Act gains little by describing 
insider status in precise, specific, even formalistic terms. Moreover, if the 
reason behind the rule is insubstantial and application of the terminology 
supersedes contextual analysis, then the object of the legislation may be 
compromised and application of its provisions becomes awkward. Par-
ties able to exert improper influence on the debtor may escape insider 
status, as the UFf A may not specify these parties' particular relation to 
the debtor. The problem with the UFf A's treatment of insiders goes 
beyond the definitional provisions. The new Act inconsistently applies 
the policies implicated in insider transactions and therefore undermines 
courts' ability to apply the new Act coherently. The next section of this 
article describes the UFf A's ambivalent treatment of certain transfers to 
insiders. 
b. Preferential Transfers to Insiders 
Section 5(b) of the UFf A renders voidable transfers by a debtor to 
an insider made "for other than a present, reasonably equivalent value" 
when the debtor was insolvent and the transferee "had reasonable cause 
to believe the debtor was insolvent."192 In comment 3 to the section, the 
drafters explain that "[a]voidance of the ... transfer without reference 
to the [transferee's] state of mind and the nature of the consideration 
exchanged would be unduly harsh treatment of the creditors of the 
[transferee] and unduly favorable to the creditors of the [debtor]."193 
That explanation undermines the detailed definition of insider; the draft-
ers, by directing that courts afford the transferee's state of mind due def-
erence, have frustrated the provision's utility. The comment's reference 
to the insider transferee's state of mind and the section 5(b) reference to 
the insider transferee's reasonable belief sacrifice any certainty and pre-
moral standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is 
wholly eliminated."); cf. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) (Holmes, J., 
writing for the Court) ("[W]e are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear 
it should be laid down once for all by the Courts."). But cf. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105 
(1934) (Cardozo, J., writing for the Court) ("The need (for caution in framing standards of conduct] 
is the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the standards have 
emerged."). 
191. See In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (secured claims of a 
creditor "in control" of the debtor corporation subordinated), re-v'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 
(7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (discussed in Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 188, at 
349-50); In re American Lumber Co., 7 Bankr. 519 (D. Minn. 1979) (debtor's post-default grant of 
security interest to creditor, and the creditor's subsequent exercise of liquidation powers and man-
agement control, was preferential, fraudulent, and resulted in subordination of secured creditor's 
claims to unsecured creditors). 
192. U.F.T.A. § 5(b). 
193. /d. § 5 comment 3. 
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dictability that the detailed insider definition provides. The nature of in-
sider status implies that once the court characterizes a transferee as an 
insider the transferee necessarily had reasonable cause to question the 
debtor's solvency. 
In sections 1(7) and S(b) the UFfA fluctuates between a specific and 
a general stance. Although an area as amorphous as fraud law is perhaps 
best defined in general terms to allow courts the flexibility necessary to 
proscribe a large number of transactions circumscribed only by the limits 
of creditors' ingenuity, good commercial reasons for specificity remain. 
The vagaries of post hoc characterization should not unduly hamper 
commercial transactions. Attorneys should be able to explain to sophis-
ticated clients whether and to what extent a court may scrutinize a par-
ticular transaction as an insider transaction. The balance is a difficult 
one to strike for all cases at all times. However the drafters may ulti-
mately resolve the tension between a specific and a general position, 
fraud law must treat insiders consistently. The Act's insider provisions 
should be unequivocal; they should not alternate between affording insid-
ers favored and suspect creditor status. But the drafters of the UFT A are 
inconsistent. The statute seems to permit contextual, fact-determinative 
analysis by reference to objective indicia. On the other hand, the statute 
inexplicably reverses direction and refers to the transactors' state of mind 
and reasonable belief. 
Another section of the Act treats insiders inconsistently. Although 
the UFT A characterizes particular transactions as fraudulent and pro-
vides consequently for punitive consequences, the drafters leave open a 
safety-valve: section 8 permits some transferees to plead and prove their 
good faith and to recover the less than reasonably equivalent value they 
have given the debtor. That recovery is unavailable to the insider trans-
feree who took on account of an antecedent debt, for less than reasonably 
equivalent value, from an insolvent debtor, when the insider had "reason-
able cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent." The comments to 
section 8(d) conclude in terms not found in the text of the Act that: 
An insider who receives property or an obligation from an in-
solvent debtor as security for or in satisfaction of an antecedent debt 
of the transferor or obligor is not a good faith transferee or obligee if. 
the insider has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insol-
vent at the time the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred. 194 
Therefore, section 8( d) does not protect an insider transferee. This result 
seems consistent with the commercial consequences of insider status. 
The Act presumes such transferees are culpable without providing an 
opportunity to prove their good faith. Once again, however, the UFf A 
vacillates. 
194. /d. § 8 comment 4. 
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Subsection 8(f) complements 8(d). The former refers specifically to 
section 5(b) insider preferences: 
(8)(f) A transfer is not voidable under section 5(b): 
(1) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of 
the debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was 
secured by a valid lien; 
(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of 
the debtor and the insider; or 
(3) if made pursuant to a good faith effort to rehabilitate the 
debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose 
as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor. 195 
At some point in the drafting process the NCCUSL may have been com-
fortable without section 8(f) because the subsection as currently drafted 
does not appear in early drafts of the Act. 196 The final draft includes the 
subsection, however, and undermines the Act's treatment of insiders. 
The comments to the subsection explain that section 8(f) adapts the 
Bankruptcy Code section 547(c) preference provisions. 197 Subsection 
195. /d. § 8(f). 
196. See U.F.T.A. § 8(f) (Proposed Draft 1984) (copy on file at the University of Illinois Law 
Review office). In this earlier draft, § 8(f) stated: "A creditor may not recover under subsection 
(b)(2) from a good-faith transferee or obligee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee 
or obligee." /d. 
197. See U.F.T.A. § 8 comment 6. Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows: 
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was 
made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and 
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; 
{2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or 
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; 
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the 
transferee; and 
(C) made according to ordinary business terms; 
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a descrip-
tion of such property as collateral; 
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement; 
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and 
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and 
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives possession of such 
property; 
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor 
gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
( A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and 
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable 
transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor; 
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of 
either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a 
reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors 
holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest 
exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of-
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 
90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
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8(t)(l) and (2) are consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. In contrast, 
subsection 8(f)(3) is new and, with UFf A section 6(4), is more favorable 
to the interests of commercial lenders than are the Bankruptcy Code 
provisions. 198 
The UFf A and Bankruptcy Code conflict over the troubled debtors' 
"feeding-the-lien" of the secured lender, thus improving the secured 
creditor's position by exercising an "after-acquired property" 199 clause. 
A hypothetical explains how parties can accomplish this transaction and 
clarifies the difference between the UFf A and the Bankruptcy Code: 
Debtor enters into a loan and security agreement with Bank. 
Debtor grants Bank a security interest in all of Debtor's accounts 
receivable "now or hereafter received by or belonging to Debtor for 
goods sold by it or services rendered by it to secure repayment of the 
loan and any attorney's fees incurred by Bank in collecting the 
loan." The loan advances cannot exceed 60 percent of the total of 
the accounts outstanding. On October 1, Debtor borrows $60,000 
and has outstanding accounts of $100,000, creating a "collateral 
cushion" of $40,000. As of February 1, Debtor owes Bank $55,000 
on the loan but only $50,000 of outstanding accounts exists. At this 
point, Bank is undersecured and a $5,000 deficiency exists. By 
March 1, however, once more $100,<X>O of outstanding accounts ex-
ist and Debtor owes the Bank only $60,000. Bank's position has 
improved between February 1 and March 1. 
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Bank would receive a voida-
ble preferential transfer to the extent Debtor reduced the deficiency dur-
ing the ninety days (or, if Bank is an insider, one year) before Debtor files 
the bankruptcy petition. That is the improvement of position, or two-
point test.200 
The Bankruptcy Code section presumes that the Bank's improved 
position is preferential despite the Bank's good faith. 201 Section 8(f) of 
or 
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section ap-
plies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement creating 
such security interest; 
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of this title; 
(7) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the 
aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600. 
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (West Supp. 1985). 
198. The applicable Bankruptcy Code section is 547(e)(3), which provides that "(t]or the pur-
poses of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor bas acquired rights in the property 
transferred." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1982). Both the Bankruptcy Code and the UFf A, therefore, 
provide that a transfer occurs when a debtor acquires rights in the collateral See U.F.T .A. § 6(4). 
199. See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1978). 
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982), amended in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985) 
(reproduced in note 197, supra). See generally 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL~ 547.10(5) (L. 
King 3d ed. 1985) {discussing the "improvement in position" test in section 547(c)(5) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code). 
201. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1985) (containing no reference to the "good 
faith" of the creditor). 
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the UFT A provides that the good faith of the Bank is relevant. Indeed, 
good faith would insulate from avoidance an improved position accom-
plished by an after-acquired property clause.202 So long as the Bank im-
proves its position (enhances its collateral base) in return for present 
value-new advances given to rehabilitate the Debtor--courts cannot 
void the transfer. The UFTA does not require that the new advance 
equal the amount of the after-acquired property, the collateral which be-
comes subject to the Bank's security interest. If the future advance does 
equal the amount of the after-acquired property, then section 5(b) will 
not proscribe the transfer (Debtor's acquired rights in the collateral sub-
ject to the Bank's security interest)203 because it does not result from an 
antecedent debt. Section 8(t)(3) therefore does more than insulate trans-
fers of after-acquired property in exchange for matching new value. The 
section also permits the Bank to improve its position to the prejudice of 
unsecured creditors under the guise of rehabilitating the Debtor. The 
UFT A accomplishes this result by not incorporating the Bankruptcy 
Code's two-point test. This result is manifestly pro-financial institution 
and suggests that unsecured creditors may lose an important safeguard 
against fraudulent transfers unless they can refute the fraudulent trans-
feree's protest of good faith.204 Moreover, deferring to the rights of insid-
ers further compromises the UFT A's treatment of parties uniquely 
postured to exert control over fiscally unsound debtors. Section 8(t) par-
ticularly is troublesome because of the timing of its inclusion in the draft 
UFT A. The provision was not in the draft submitted to the Commis-
sioners at the beginning of the Colorado meeting. Nevertheless, section 
8(t) appeared in the draft which emerged from the Conference only seven 
days later.205 
B. The Insolvency Requirement. 
Although the UFT A proscribes transactions executed "with actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor" without 
reference to the solvency of the debtor/transferor, 206 transactions accom-
panied by less insidious mens rea are subject to avoidance only when the 
debtor is insolvent before or after the transfer. 207 This formulation re-
tains standard, familiar, fraudulent conveyance law. This article assumes 
that by focusing on the debtor's solvency to distinguish between transac-
tions which merely injure rather than utterly destroy the debtor's fiscal 
202. See U.F.T.A. § 8(t). 
203. See id. § 6(4). 
204. The drafters of the UFT A, while expressly providing creditors with the "good faith" ex-
ception, apparently have permitted courts to allocate the burden of proof on the issue. Neither the 
applicable UFTA section nor the comment to that section discusses the matter. See U.F.T.A. 
§ 8(f)(3); id. § 8 comment 6. 
205. Copies of preliminary drafts are on file at the University of Illinois Law Review office. 
206. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(l) (1984). 
207. See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text; U .F .T.A. § 5. See also supra notes 126-35 
and accompanying text; U.F.T.A. § 4(a) (discussing other forms of constructive fraud). 
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integrity, proponents of fraudulent transfer law mean to limit the trans-
actions which are presumptively avoidable. Ex post facto review of all 
the debtor's transactions would spawn too much litigation and compro-
mise too many deals from the vantage offered only by hindsight. 
Although courts will punish intentional wrongdoing, complaining credi-
tors must either prove such intent or establish the insolvency of the 
debtor. 
The drafters of the UFT A acknowledged (indeed codified) the diffi-
culty of establishing subjective bad intent by cataloging the indicia of 
·control in the insider and affiliate definitions. 208 In deciding which trans-
actions should be subject to avoidance, however, the insolvency of the 
transferor may not matter. Further, insolvency analysis may confuse the 
purpose and operation of fraudulent transfer law. To reach a conclusion 
regarding the efficacy of the insolvency criterion, this article considers 
two important commercial contexts in which fraudulent conveyance 
analysis has received attention. 
1. Upstream and Cross-stream Guaranty Relationships 
Upstream guaranties arise when a subsidiary corporation guaranties 
its parent's indebtedness; cross-stream guaranties describe a corpora-
tion's guaranty of an affiliated corporate debtor, such as one subsidiary's 
guaranty of another subsidiary's performance. 209 Professor Rosenberg 
has suggested that the two types of guaranty contracts entail the guaran-
tor's (debtor's) assumption of a liability, the guaranty obligation, without 
the realization of a counterbalancing asset. 210 Therefore, the debtor exe-
cutes an upstream or cross-stream guaranty "without receiving a reason-
ably equivalent value in exchange for the ... obligation."211 Then, so 
long as the debtor is insolvent, state or federal fraudulent conveyance law 
applies and the guaranty contract is subject to avoidance. 
Insolvency analysis exposes the metaphysics of this type of fraudu-
lent conveyance attack. Creditors who take upstream and cross-stream 
guaranties argue that the solvency of the debtor should not be in issue 
because when the subsidiary or affiliate corporation assumes the guaranty 
obligation, the guaranty's liability is necessarily offset by the concomitant 
subrogation rights which the common law assures those who answer for 
the debt of another.212 Comment 2 to the UFTA section 1(2) definition 
of asset provides that "a contingent claim of a surety for reimbursement, 
contribution, or subrogation may be counted as an asset" in the solvency 
208. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text; U.F.T.A. §§ I( I), 1(7). 
209. See Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender 
Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 238-39 & nn.3-4 (1976). 
210. See id. at 256. 
211. U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2). 
212. See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp.), 
578 F.2d 904, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[C]ontingent subrogation and contribution rights must be valued 
as assets in determining solvency."). 
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calculus.213 Professor Rosenberg argues, however, that 
[t]he notion that the guaranty of a solvent obligor is offset by a con-
tingent asset based on the right of subrogation is simply not realistic; 
when and if the guarantor is called upon to perform, the value of 
that contingent asset in all likelihood would be discounted severely 
because it probably would be no longer collectible. Otherwise, the 
guarantor would not have been called upon to perform.214 
The courts now consider the valuation of contingent subrogation and 
contribution rights without embracing the Rosenberg analysis.215 Com-
mentators, notably those promoting the positions of creditors who take 
the upstream or cross-stream guaranty, are likewise less receptive to ar-
guments which question the valuation of subrogation rights.216 From the 
perspective of the drafters of fraudulent transfer law, however, the de-
bate's outcome and the courts' valuation of subrogation rights should not 
be quite as interesting as the cause for all of the fuss: creditors who have 
given nothing tangible, no "hard" corporeal assets, to a 
debtor/guarantor seek to uphold the guaranty contract, often secured by 
real and personal property, because executing the guaranty does not 
render the debtor/guarantor insolvent. Such creditors can make such an 
argument, and fend off fraudulent conveyance attack, only because the 
drafters of fraudulent conveyance law have decided that solvency mat-
ters. Because the issue is apposite only when the transaction rendered 
the debtor insolvent, or left the debtor with "unreasonably small capital 
[assets),"217 lenders who take upstream and cross-stream guaranties can 
avoid confronting the "reasonably equivalent value" issue. 
Understood in the context of the essential purpose of fraud law and 
properly construed, the reference to unreasonably small assets should be 
sufficient to function as uniform legislation on this topic. The enigma, 
then, is why the UFT A retains the insolvency idea in section 5(a). The 
concept has outlived its usefulness in a complex financial world where 
solvency analyses are more matters of professional opinion than fixed, 
verifiable measures. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code acknowledged 
and codified the flexible valuation determinations.218 The real problem 
213. U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 2. 
214. Rosenberg, supra note 209, at 256 (emphasis added). 
215. See. e.g., Manufacturers v. Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip. 
Corp.), 578 F.2d 904, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. Comm'r, 560 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. Haight, 97 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1938); Updike v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 
53 F.2d 369, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1931); Wingert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660, 662 (4th Cir.), cen. 
denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930); First Nat'l Bank v. Jefferson Sales & Distribs., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 659, 
672 (S.D. Miss. 1971), affd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Bowers, 215 F. 617-18 
(N.D. Ga. 1914). 
216. See Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 
61 N.C.L. REv. 655, 679-82 (citing and quoting Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of 
a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 433, 438-46 (1980)). 
217. U.F.C.A. § 5. 
218. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 9Sth Cong., 2d Sess. 178 {1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138 (describes the previous preference provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code as including "several impediments to the proper functioning" of the provision, among which 
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with confusing fraud law by retaining the insolvency standard in section 
5(a) alongside the unreasonably small assets test, section 4(a)(2)(i), is that 
the objective indicia of section 5 may overcome the more subjective in-
quiry of section 4 and may insulate some transfers by creating a safe 
harbor. 
Counsel for a creditor who has received an upstream or cross-stream 
guaranty would argue that relying on the unreasonably small assets stan-
dard eviscerates the specificity, certainty, and predictability of the section 
5 insolvency requisite. Counsel would urge a court to focus, instead, on 
the debtor's solvency. Indeed, the fact that the unsecured creditors of 
the debtor/guarantor are in court challenging the guaranty makes the 
argument that the debtor retained unreasonably small assets easy, even 
tautological. If the debtor had sufficient assets, then the complaining 
creditors would have satisfied their claims without judicial intervention. 
To preclude such circular analysis, courts may have to construe the un-
reasonably small assets language by referring to objective criteria: the 
balance sheets of the debtor/guarantor. As the next section of the article 
illustrates, however, the "certainty" offered by financial statements is 
ephemeral at best, manipulable at worst. 
2. Leveraged Business Acquisitions 
Although the potential factual contexts vary, the leveraged business 
acquisition is sufficiently general to support observations which accu-
rately describe the dynamics of more than limited, isolated transactions. 
A generic hypothetical is useful: 
The aging management and shareholders (sellers) of a privately held 
company approach a group interested in acquiring the company. 
Ambition-rich but relatively cash-poor, the acquisition group ar-
ranges financing through a bank or commercial finance company. 
The lender advances the loan proceeds against the assets (accounts 
receivable, inventory, equipment, real property) of the acquired 
company. The acquisition group pays for the sellers' interest in cash 
(and perhaps a promissory note). Sellers transfer ownership of the 
company and its assets to the acquisition group subject to the secur-
ity and perhaps mortgage interest of the lender. The individual 
members of the acquisition group, at the insistence of the secured 
lender, often will execute personal (usually secured) guaranties of 
the acquisition loan. 219 
One of the pitfalls of such transactions from the lender's perspective is 
the potential for fraudulent conveyance challenges under state and fed-
was the requirement that "the trustee prove the debtor's insolvency at the time the preferential 
transfer was made"). 
219. Reisman, The Structure of Leveraged Acquisitions: Economic Considerations in LEVER-
AGED BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 9, 30-33 (Practicing Law Institute No. 305, 1979) inspired this 
hypothetical. 
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erallaw. One commentator notes that the transaction may prejudice the 
unsecured creditors of the acquired corporation: 
[W]here the acquisition takes the form of a merger or asset purchase 
... the acquired assets simply become part of the acquiring [entity] 
. . . . In such a case, where the enabling loan is secured by the 
present and after-acquired assets of the acquiring [entity] . .. , the 
lender has now achieved not mere parity with pre-existing creditors 
but priority in the assets of the acquired corporation. 220 
The commentator further explains, in terms familiar to fraudulent trans-
fer analysis, that the net result of the transaction is to encumber the 
debtor's assets "without providing a direct benefit to the corporation."221 
Practitioners' guides suggest various devices which acquisition lend-
ers may use to preclude or limit avoidance of the security interest portion 
of the leveraged acquisition as a fraudulent conveyance. 222 These guides 
advise lenders' counsel to obtain appraisals, and procure cash flow and 
balance sheet projections "showing ability of company to continue its 
business for at least one year anp meet its assumed and future obligations 
as they mature. " 223 In addition to supplying indispensable loan memo-
randum information, such precautions "also establish bona fides and 
good faith of lender in entering into transaction in reliance upon bor-
rower's solvency and future working capital viability."224 Appearances 
aside, here is the essence of the leveraged business acquisition transaction 
from the perspective of unsecured creditors: assets to which such credi-
tors once could look to realize their claims against the debtor corporation 
are now, ostensibly, beyond their reach. The crucial element is the grant 
of the subordinating security interest, not the change of ownership. 
Compare this with the effect that a conventional Article 9 secured trans-
action has on the debtor's unsecured creditors. 
Under the UFCA courts have considered the discrepancy between 
the amount of a debtor's loan and the value of the collateral hypothe-
cated by the debtor to secure the loan. 225 When the discrepancy is large, 
courts are more likely to allow parties to avoid the security interest. 226 
The UFT A does not distinguish between absolute transfers and security 
transfers: "The premise of this Act is that when a transfer is for security 
only, the equity ... remains .available to unsecured creditors and thus 
cannot be regarded as the subject of a fraudulent transfer merely because 
of the encumbrance resulting from an otherwise valid security trans-
fer."227 This solution of a commercial incongruity is welcome, but the 
220. Rosenberg, Fraudulent Conveyance and Preference Implications of Leveraged Acquisitions, 
in LEVERAGED BUSINESS ACQUISmONS 147, 151 (Practicing Law Institute No. 305, 1979). 
221. /d. at 152. 
222. See Reisman, supra note 219, at 26-27. 
223. /d. (emphasis added}. 
224. /d. at 27. 
225. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. 
226. See cases cited supra note 100. 
227. U.F.T.A. § 4 comment 3. 
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fraudulent transfer analysis of conventional Article 9 secured transac-
tions and leveraged business acquisitions remains confused. The next 
sentence of the same UFf A comment creates the confusion, by explain-
ing that "[d]isproportion between the value of the asset securing the debt 
and the size of the debt secured"228 may still raise fraud problems when 
the transaction suggests "an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud credi-
tors"229 of the transferor. Parties may avoid, then, an Article 9 security 
interest. Similarly, courts may void leveraged business acquisitions 
under the UFT A because "the corporate assets and cash flow are encum-
bered with an obligation which was incurred without providing a direct 
benefit to the corporation. " 230 The acquisition also might provide the 
basis of an intentional fraud claim. Neither transaction is voidable under 
UFf A section S(a), constructive fraud, however, unless the 
debtor/transferor was insolvent at the time of the transaction. 
The similarities between a conventional Article 9 security interest 
and a leveraged business acquisition are significant from the perspective 
of the debtor's unsecured creditors. One of the reasons that Article 9 
secured lenders provide a collateral cushion in sophisticated loan trans-
actions, advancing funds against only seventy to eighty percent of the 
value of the assets securing the loan, is to provide an asset fund from 
which parties may obtain attorneys' fees and collection expenses. In-
deed, the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that secured creditors 
may obtain reimbursement for attorneys' fees "[t]o the extent .. . [a] 
secured claim is secured by property the value of which .. . is greater 
than the amount of such claim . . . . " 231 Satisfaction of such obligations 
in no way accrues to the direct benefit of the debtor's unsecured credi-
tors. Because the language in the UFfA comment is contradictory, the 
new Act leaves open the question whether the "[d]isproportion between 
the value of the asset securing the debt and the size of the debt secured" 
may be a measure of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud under the UFTA. 
The extent to which the question remains open also is, arguably, a mea-
sure of the similarity between the typical Article 9 financing transaction 
and the leveraged business acquisition. If courts will equate a large dis-
crepancy with actual fraudulent intent and, also, find subjective fraud in 
the context of leveraged business acquisitions, then the debtor's solvency 
no longer matters-the transactions are avoidable and insolvency analy-
sis is inapposite. Recall that the solvency of the debtor/transferor is not 
in issue when a creditor attacks a transfer as intentionally fraudulent. 
The UFT A does not clearly provide such a result. Instead, the 
drafters vacillate. Part of the problem, perhaps its crux, is the in-
determinancy of the concept of "direct" benefit. After all, businesspeople 
do not brave the vicissitudes of the commercial world for the benefit of 
228. /d. 
229. U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1). 
230. Rosenberg, supra note 220, at 152. 
231. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982), amended in 11 U .S.C.A. § 506(b) (West Supp. 1985). 
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their creditors. Fraudulent transfer law balances benefit to the owners of 
a corporation against detriment to the corporation's unsecured creditors. 
The fraudulent transfer analysis in either event should focus on the trans-
action's commercial substance from the perspective of the transferee and 
the unsecured creditors of the debtor/transferor; evaluation of the 
debtor/transferor's solvency just does not seem important. Although 
more aggressive use of the actual fraud provisions is necessary, the 
UFT A does not accommodate such analysis. So long as the several bod-
ies of state and federal fraudulent transfer law adopt insolvency as a cer-
tain measure, courts will refer to less consequential, more manipulable 
phenomena, such as balance sheets, and will obscure the subtle fraudu-
lent transfer balance. In both the corporate guaranty and leveraged busi-
ness acquisition contexts, the ambiguity of insolvency analysis may 
obscure the substance of the transaction. Courts, commentators, and 
commercial attorneys focus on the calculable solvency of the 
debtor/transferor. Creditors thus should keep the transferor afloat for 
the duration of the applicable statute of limitations. 232 Therefore, in~ol­
vency, which has become more an accountants' state of mind than an 
.inevitable state of affairs, may be a relic of a less enlightened commercial 
world. A business need not be insolvent to seek the protections of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.233 The concept remains only to "pr9-
tect" transferees. Insolvency provides a means to construct a safe har-
bor, as the "reasonably equivalent value" inquiry is inapposite when the 
debtor was solvent at the time of the challenged transfer. By retaining 
both the insolvency standard (section 5(a)), and the "unreasonably small 
assets" concept (section 4(a)(2)) and reference to intentional fraud in the 
context of secured transactions, the UFT A threatens to perpetuate for-
mal rather than substantive analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has presented the provisions of the UFT A and described 
the way in which the new Act would adjust the rights of the parties af-
fected by certain fraudulent transactions. Legislatures and courts must 
carefully consider the dynamics of commercial transactions and think 
through the way in which the UFT A would apply to allegedly fraudulent 
transfers. This analysis should focus on the incentives and safe harbors 
which the Act provides. This article has given careful attention to the 
language of the Act because the Act will, in large part, structure transac-
tions. The balance between specific and general terminology is crucial in 
this area of commercial law. Perhaps the drafters of the UFTA did not 
achieve the proper balance. Because acquiescing in the formulations 
232. Courts may extinguish claims under the UFf A at various intervals, depending upon the 
nature of the cause of action. See U.F.T.A. § 9. 
233. See 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL~ 301.03 (L. King 3d ed. 1981). 
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which have obtained heretofore is inappropriate, this article views the 
new Act's adoption of existing fraud principles critically. 
In particular, this article questions the UFf A's treatment of insiders 
and urges that the drafters reconsider the insolvency criterion in light of 
contemporary commercial practices. The authors hope that this article 
will provide a starting point to consider this most recent codification of 
fraud law, an area of the law which legislatures should conclude is not 
subject to neat formulation. 
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APPENDIX 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 1. Definitions 
As used in this [Act]: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(i) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds 
with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting 
securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the 
securities, 
(A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary 
power to vote the securities; or 
(B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised 
the power to vote; 
(ii) a corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding vot-
ing securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held 
with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indi-
rectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or 
more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities, 
(A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the 
securities; or 
(B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact 
exercised the power to vote; 
(iii) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a 
lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose as-
sets are controlled by the debtor; or 
(iv) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease 
or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's 
assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but the term does not 
include: 
(i) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
(ii) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonban-
kruptcy law; or 
(iii) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to 
the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim 
against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
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(7) "Insider" includes: 
(i) if the debtor is an individual, 
(A) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the 
debtor; 
(B) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(C) a general partner in a partnership described in clause 
(B); or 
(D) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, 
or person in control; 
(ii) if the debtor is a corporation, 
(A) a director of the debtor; 
(B) an officer of the debtor; 
(C) a person in control of the debtor; 
(D) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(E) a general partner in a partnership described in clause 
(D); or 
(F) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or per-
son in control of the debtor; 
(iii) if the debtor is a partnership, 
(A) a general partner in the debtor; 
(B) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, 
or a person in control of the debtor; 
(C) another partnership in which the debtor is a general 
partner; 
(D) a general partner in a partnership described in clause 
(C); or 
(E) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate 
were the debtor; and 
(v) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to se-
cure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a 
security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or 
equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, associ-
ation, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, 
business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of 
ownership. 
(ll) "Relative" means an individual related by consanguinity 
within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or 
an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so deter-
mined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the 
third degree. 
No.3] UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACf 567 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an 
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, 
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means that a lien is effective against the holder of 
a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or 
proceedings. 
§ 2. Insolvency 
(a) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater 
than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. 
(b) A debtor who is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they 
become due is presumed to be insolvent. 
(c) A partnership is insolvent under subsection (a) if the sum of the 
partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all 
of the partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each 
general partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership 
debts. 
(d) Assets under this section do not include property that has been 
transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the 
transfer voidable under this [Act]. 
(e) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the ex-
tent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as 
an asset. 
§ 3. Value 
(a) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for 
the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is 
secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise 
made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to 
furnish support to the debtor or another person. 
(b) For the purposes of Sections 4(a)(2) and 5, a person gives a rea-
sonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor 
in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure 
sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of 
the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or 
security agreement. 
(c) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the 
debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and 
is in fact substantially contemporaneous. 
§ 4. Transfers Fraudulent as to Present and Future Creditors 
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent 
as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the 
transfer or incurred the obligation: 
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(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor 
of the debtor; or 
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a 
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were 
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should 
have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or 
her] ability to pay as they became due. 
(b) In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), considera-
tion may be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property 
transferred after the transfer; 
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
( 4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, 
the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
( 6) the debtor absconded; 
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was 
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the 
amount of the obligation incurred; 
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
( 1 0) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a sub-
stantial debt was incurred; and 
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business 
to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
§ 5. Transfers Fraudulent as to Present Creditors 
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent 
as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the 
obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange 
for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or 
the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose 
claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an 
insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and 
the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 
§ 6. When Transfer is Made or Obligation is Incurred 
For the purposes of this [Act]: 
( 1) a transfer is made: 
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(i) with respect to an asset that is real property other than 
a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser 
under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so 
far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the 
debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be 
perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior 
to the interest of the transferee; and 
(ii) with respect to an asset that is not real property or 
that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a 
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien 
otherwise than under this [Act] that is superior to the interest 
of the transferee; 
(2) if applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as pro-
vided in paragraph (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the 
commencement of an action for relief under this [Act], the transfer 
is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the 
action; 
(3) if applicable law does not permit the transfer to be per-
fected as provided in paragraph (1), the transfer is made when it 
becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee; 
(4) a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights 
in the asset transferred; 
(5) an obligation is incurred: 
(i) if oral, when it becomes effective between parties; or 
(ii) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed 
by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee. 
§ 7. Remedies of Creditors 
(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this 
[Act], a creditor; subject to the limitations in Section 8, may obtain: 
(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent neces-
sary to satisfy the creditor's claim; 
[(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the as-
set transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance 
with the procedure prescribed by [ ];] 
(3) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance 
with applicable rules of civil procedure, 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor 
or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other 
property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset 
transferred or of other property of the transferee: [sic]or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the 
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debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the 
asset transferred or its proceeds. 
§ 8. Defenses, Liability, and Protection of Transferee 
(a) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Section 4(a)(l) 
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent 
value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a 
transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under Section 7(a)(1), the 
. creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as 
adjusted under subsection (c), or the amount necessary to satisfy the 
creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against: 
(1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose 
benefit the transfer was made; or 
(2) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee 
who took for value or from any subsequent transferee. 
(c) If the judgment under subsection (b) is based upon the value of 
the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the 
value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the 
equities may require. 
(d) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under 
this [Act], a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of 
the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to 
(1) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset 
transferred; 
(2) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(3) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment. 
(e) A transfer is not voidable under Section 4(a)(2) or Section 5 if 
the transfer results from: 
(1) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the 
termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or 
(2) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
(t) A transfer is not voidable under Section S(b ): 
(1) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit 
of the debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was 
secured by a valid lien; 
(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial af-
fairs of the debtor and the insider; or 
(3) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the 
debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose 
as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor. 
§ 9. Extinguishment of [Claim for RelieD [Cause of Action] 
A [claim for relief] [cause of action] with respect to a fraudulent 
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transfer or obligation under this [Act] is extinguished unless action is 
brought: 
(a) under Section 4(a)(1), within 4 years after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year 
after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been 
discovered by the claimant; 
(b) under Section 4(a)(2) or 5(a), within 4 years after the trans-
fer was made or the obligation was incurred; or 
(c) under Section 5(b ), within one year after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred. 
§ 10. Supplementary Provisions 
Unless displaced by the provisions of this [Act], the principles of law 
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal 
and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supple-
ment its provisions. 
§ 11. Uniformity of Application and Construction 
This [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] 
among states enacting it. 
§ 12. Short Title 
This [Act] may be cited as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
§ 13. Repeal 
The following acts and all other acts and parts of acts inconsistent 
herewith are hereby repealed[.] 
